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I.

INTRODUCTION

The implementation of environmental law and policy often, if not typically,
proceeds in the face of scientific uncertainty. Indeed, as Holly Doremus has explained,
“[t]he most universally recognized feature of environmental problems is the pervasive
uncertainty that surrounds them.”1 Legislators or administrative agencies crafting
programs to minimize the risk that exposure to pollution will cause adverse human health
effects often lack information about the pathways of exposure, the levels at which
exposure will cause adverse effects, or even about the kinds of adverse effects that may
result from exposure. Nearly thirty years ago, Talbot Page described nine characteristics
that exemplify the kind of “environmental risk” problems typified by the leakage of
hazardous waste or the production of toxic chemicals. Four of those characteristics
emphasized scientific uncertainty, and Page listed “ignorance of mechanism” as the first
characteristic of an environmental risk problem.2 Scientific uncertainty is no less
endemic to natural resource management regimes,3 transforming scientific disputes
concerning such regimes into judgment calls “about how incomplete data are interpreted

∗

Robert W. Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas; Member Scholar, Center for Progressive
Reform. Thanks to Batsheva Glatt, Class of 2007, for her valuable research and editing assistance. Thanks
also go to Andrew Torrance for his useful insights on the scientific method. Finally, thanks go to all of the
participants at the conference on “Missing Information: Environmental Data Gaps in Conservation and
Chemical Regulation” that was held at the University of Indiana-Bloomington on March 24, 2006 (and
particularly John Applegate and Robert Fischman, the conference organizers) for a lively and informative
discussion of issues raised by agency efforts to bridge scientific data gaps in environmental law.
1
Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 319 (2003) [cited
hereineafter as Doremus, Constitutive Law]. See also Carol Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up (More or
Less), and What Science Can Do to Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 273 (2005) (stating that “in
environmental areas the problem of decisionmaking under uncertainty is particularly acute”); Robert N.
Stavins, What Baseball Can Teach Policymakers, 22 ENVTL. F. 14 (Sept/Oct. 2005) (asserting that
“[u]ncertainty is an absolutely fundamental aspect of environmental problems and the policies that are
employed to address those problems” and that “[a]ny analysis that fails to recognize this runs the risk not
only of being incomplete, but misleading as well”).
2
Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 208-09 (1978).
Cass Sunstein distinguishes between “risk, for which probabilities can be assigned to various outcomes,
and uncertainty, for which no probabilities can be assigned.” Cass. R. Sunstein, Irreversible and
Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 848 (2006).
3
See, e.g., John M. Volkman, How Do You Learn from A River? Managing Uncertainty in Species
Conservation Policy, 74 WASH. L. REV. 719, 723 (1999) (stating that “[e]ven people aware of the problem
of shrinking biodiversity are likely to be surprised by how much scientific uncertainty there is in species
conservation policy”). See generally James Wilson, Scientific Uncertainty, Complex Systems, and the
Design of Common-Pool Institutions, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 327, 335-47 (Elinor Ostrom et al.
eds., 2002).
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and applied.”4 In both areas, “the most important decisions must be made under extreme
conditions of scientific uncertainty.”5
Despite this pervasive uncertainty, Congress has directed the agencies responsible
for administering the environmental statutes to ground their policy decisions in science.
The implicit assumption reflected in many of these laws is that “science would drive
decision-making and that agencies could interpret scientific information to set the right
policies.”6 For a variety of reasons, however, an inquiry that may be posed in scientific
terms may have no single correct answer, or even no answer at all.7 These may include
insufficient research, incomplete theoretical understandings, or “merely the great
complexity of natural and human systems.”8 As a result, as one court put it in an early
case involving regulation of toxic water pollutants, environmental statutes often present
agencies with “a veritable paradox [by] calling . . . for knowledge of that which is
unknown.”9
Agencies sometimes cope with the responsibility of making science-based
decisions despite the presence of uncertainty by relying on scientific models or otherwise
using the limited information available to them to make predictions about the impacts of
agency decisions on the environment. In trying to ascertain the effects of a decision on a
complex ecosystem, for example, an agency may use the known effects of the decision on
one component of that ecosystem as a surrogate for the effects of the decision on the
ecosystem as a whole. These techniques allow agency decisionmakers, by simulating
reality, to organize available information and plug holes created by unavailable
information to reach what appears to be a rational and objective conclusion about the
environmental effects of the action being contemplated. The use of simulation modeling
and surrogates in this fashion thus enables agencies to conform to their statutory
responsibilities to base decisions on scientific considerations, even though a complete
understanding of the relationships between the actions they are proposing to take, or
authorize others to take, and the resulting environmental effects may be beyond their
current capabilities or impossible ever fully to ascertain.
The reliance by pollution control and natural resource management agencies on
scientific models or on surrogate parameters to make decisions under federal
environmental legislation has generated significant controversy, despite its utility in
addressing the paradox created by statutory mandates to make decisions based on
unavailable information. Scientific models are built upon assumptions, which are often
based on value judgments and therefore tend to be contested. Even if agreement exists on
the assumptions upon which a model is based, there may be disagreements about the
applicability of the model to a particular problem or situation. Moreover, competing
4

Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural Resource Regulation,
26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 3 (2005).
5
A. Dan Tarlock, Who Owns Science?, 10 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L.J. 135, 141 (2002).
6
James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between Models and Participation
in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 909 (2005).
7
See STEPHEN BOCKING, SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 27 (2004).
8
Id. at 26.
9
Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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models or differential applications of a single model may yield starkly divergent
predictions about the effects of an agency’s decision on the environment. As a result,
litigation concerning the use of simulation models and surrogate parameters by
environmental and resource management agencies has been plentiful.
This article considers the lessons that may be drawn from the recent controversy
created by one federal agency’s shifting approach to the use of models and surrogates.
The National Forest Management Act (NFMA)10 delegates to the National Forest Service
(Forest Service, or Service) the responsibility to develop land and resource management
plans (LRMPs) for units of the National Forest System (NFS)11 and to make site-specific
decisions about the use of those units in a manner consistent with the plans.12 The
NFMA charges the Forest Service with the task of issuing regulations governing the land
use planning process that, among other things, “provide for diversity of plant and animal
communities based on the suitability and capability of the specific land area.”13 The
Service has encountered difficulty in carrying out its responsibility to issue and apply
those regulations because of the enormous complexity of the ecosystems within the
forests under its jurisdiction. To minimize the uncertainty it faces in predicting what
impact a particular proposed action, such as a timber sale, will have on the diversity of
plant and animal species in the affected forest, the Forest Service has turned to the use of
models and surrogates. For years, acting under land use planning regulations issued by
the agency in 1982, it identified management indicator species (MIS) that it determined
were representative of the health of the ecosystem as a whole. The MIS were supposed
to act as surrogates for the impact of activities such as timber sales on plant and animal
diversity. The agency’s aim was to predict the effects of management actions on the
selected MIS and to monitor the fate of the MIS after the action was taken to determine
whether the action was interfering with diversity. If it was, suitable changes in
management approaches could then be made.14
The process of monitoring the effect of management actions such as timber sales
on MIS, however, turned out to be a burdensome one, requiring the Forest Service to
count MIS populations. The Forest Service began using the health of the habitat of the
MIS as a surrogate for the health of the MIS themselves. Thus, MIS habitat served as a
surrogate, or proxy, for the health of the MIS, which in turn served as a surrogate for the
diversity of plant and animal communities in the ecosystem as a whole. When litigants
challenged this “proxy-on-proxy” approach to compliance with the Forest Service’s
requirement to provide for diversity in the planning process, the courts were unable to
agree on whether this approach is consistent with the NFMA.15
In 2000, the Clinton Administration amended the NFMA planning regulations,
but the Bush Administration quickly replaced those regulations with its own approach to
10

16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687.
16 U.S.C. § 1604(a).
12
16 U.S.C. § 1604(i).
13
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
14
See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
15
See infra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
11
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planning. The Forest Service’s 2005 regulations completely scrap the agency’s
obligation to track the impact of management actions on MIS, based on the agency’s
conclusion that the MIS approach had been unreliable and flawed. In its place, the
regulations require that the Service ensure the maintenance of biological diversity by
taking into account the “best available science” and by focusing in most cases on the
effect of management actions on diversity at the ecosystem rather than the species level.16
The fate of the agency’s latest approach to dealing with scientific uncertainty in fulfilling
the NFMA’s diversity mandate is not yet clear. A federal district court enjoined
implementation of the 2005 regulations due to the Forest Service’s noncompliance with
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)17and the Endangered Species Act
(ESA),18 but it did not address the legality of the regulations under the NFMA.19
This article explores the Forest Service’s implementation of the NFMA’s
diversity mandate to illustrate the benefits and disadvantages of using scientific models
and surrogates techniques that allow agencies to fulfill their mandates to make sciencebased decisions in the face of incomplete information and scientific uncertainty. Part II
explores the paradox created when statutes require agencies to protect environmental
resources by basing their decisions on science, despite limited knowledge of the manner
in which the kinds of activities subject to the agency’s jurisdiction have affected those
resources in the past or will affect them in the future. It also describes the utility of
modeling and surrogates as techniques for resolving the paradox, and how the federal
courts have reacted to challenges to reliance on these analytical techniques. Part III
analyzes the use of models and surrogates in the specific context of the Forest Service’s
efforts to comply with the NFMA’s requirement to protect the diversity of plant and
animal species in the land use planning process that governs use of the national forests.
Part IV provides a list of criteria by which modeling and similar simulation techniques
should be judged and assesses how the Forest Service’s efforts to implement the diversity
requirement fare using those criteria as standards. The criteria include recognition of the
limits of scientific knowledge, collaboration, transparency, flexibility, and accountability.
II.

BOUNDED RATIONALITY
BRIDGE DATA GAPS

AND THE

USE

OF

MODELING

AND

SURROGATES

TO

Because scientific uncertainty is such a pervasive feature of the analysis and
resolution of environmental problems, administrative agencies responsible for protecting
human health and the environment or for managing natural resources such as those
contained on the lands owned by the federal government often must make decisions
without access to what would appear to be crucial information.20 The situation facing
16

See infra notes 198-239 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f.
18
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
19
Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
20
The scientific uncertainty that surrounds many environmental problems is multi-faceted. In some cases,
scientific uncertainty exists because research that is currently feasible has not yet been conducted. In
others, it may exist because ethical prohibitions, resource constraints, or limits on available
experimentation methods make it impossible to generate the information that would reduce the uncertainty.
See Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181, 190-91.
17
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these agencies involves what may be called “bounded rationality”; the decisionmaker’s
effort to understand the implications of its actions is bounded by constraints on its ability
to gather or analyze information. Yet the statutes under which these agencies operate
typically require that their decisions be the product of scientific analysis.
At times, Congress has recognized the uncertain milieu in which an agency’s
decisionmaking process is steeped by allowing the agency to make its decisions based on
the “best available science,” usually without defining, however, what constitutes the best
available scientific information or how the agency is supposed to go about accumulating
or assessing it. Agencies have developed different methods for enabling them to make
decisions with potential effects on the environment despite missing or incompletely
understood information. Among these important techniques is the use of models or
surrogates that produce simulations of the real world based on limited information. This
part discusses the problem of bounded rationality, how it affects the statutory obligations
of agencies to factor science into their determinations, and both the benefits and limits of
modeling and the use of surrogates as techniques for dealing with bounded rationality.
A.

Bounded Rationality, Science, and Value Judgments
Environmental and Natural Resource Management Laws

In

The need to make decisions in the absence of complete information is not unique
to the federal agencies responsible for protecting human health and the environment or
for managing the federal lands and the resources they contain. The behavioral school of
economics posited during the 1950s that various kinds of institutional decisionmaking are
subject to what advocates of that school of thought referred to as “bounded rationality.”21
The essential insight of the behavioral economists
was that decision-making in any institution is “bounded” by time, resources, and
cognitive constraints that make it virtually impossible to verify that the solution
chosen is optimal. In other words, an effort to find the “best” solution to a
problem will be hindered by time and cost constraints that limit the search for
alternative solutions and information for measuring which solution is better. In
addition, individuals are subject to significant cognitive limitations that restrict
their ability to make the judgments necessary to pick an optimal solution.22
If the desire to reach the optimal decision were not to be crippled by the presence
of bounded rationality, the decisionmaker would have to find a solution to the problem at
hand that was “good enough,” such as by basing the solution on the known factors that
the decisionmaker regards as most relevant and important. As a result, the best that
organizations facing bounded rationality can do is to rely on “’rules of thumb’ or
‘heuristics,’ that take into account real-world limitations.”23 Although this kind of
decisionmaking is not based on “comprehensive rationality,” it is nevertheless rational
21

SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC
APPROACH 23 (2003).
22
Id.
23
Id.
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because it seeks to advance the organization’s goals despite the existence of limited
knowledge and uncertainty.
Environmental agencies often engage in the kind of decisionmaking techniques
described by the behavioral economists. They do so, as Carol Rose has explained,
because policymaking bodies such as legislatures and administrative agencies, unlike
scientists, “have to make up their minds on the basis of very incomplete information. . . .
Doing nothing is a decision too, and — like doing the wrong thing — it can be a decision
that makes environmental problems much worse.”24
Reliance on rules of thumb, heuristics, or other techniques for facilitating
decisionmaking in the face of scientific uncertainty necessarily requires that the agencies
employing those techniques move beyond science as the sole basis for decision.25 An
agency that relies on heuristics to make decisions based on limited information generally
seeks to extrapolate the available information to a different context. Suppose, for
example, that an agency that has conducted tests in which animals were exposed to toxic
chemicals at high doses wants to determine the likely effects of exposing humans to those
same chemicals at much lower doses. If the agency has no data points in the low-dose
region at which humans are likely to be exposed, it must extrapolate the test data in the
high-dose region of the dose-response curve to the low-dose region for which information
is lacking. If an agency responsible for protecting the vitality of an ecosystem decides
that it is impractical to accumulate the information needed to assess the impact of a
management action on the entire ecosystem, it may decide to focus on the status of one
resource as a proxy for the status of the ecosystem as a whole.
Those kinds of extrapolations, however, are no longer exclusively scientific
determinations. Instead, they depend on value judgments inherent in the selection of the
methods by which the extrapolation from known to missing information will be made, as
there may be multiple possible methods, all of which fit the known facts equally well.26
24

Rose, supra note 1, at 290.
As Wendy Wagner has explained:
“Science” has been conveniently, albeit roughly, defined by the Supreme Court as that knowledge
“derived by [or grounded in] the scientific method.” Information is generally not scientific
knowledge . . . unless it can be supported by a “scientifically valid” “reasoning or methodology.”
In most cases this requires the ability to test a hypothesis in a replicable way or to use methods
that scientists have generally accepted as valid. When an experiment or observation cannot
realistically be conducted (or replicated) to answer a hypothesis or question, the question leaves
the province of science and must be resolved in some other way.
Wagner, supra note 20, at 188.
26
See id. at 189. See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2256 (2002)
(quoting PHILLIP L. WILLIAMS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF TOXICOLOGY 456 (2000)) (“Because the shape of the
dose-response curve in the low-dose region cannot be verified by measurement, there is no means to
determine which shape is correct .... [W]hen modeling the risks associated with lower doses, the dose/risk
range in which regulatory agencies and risk assessors are most frequently interested, there is a wide
divergence in the risk projected by [different models, all of which fit existing evidence.] ... In fact ... the
risks predicted by these ... models produce a 70,000-fold variation in the predicted response.”); ROBERT L.
GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 723 (5th ed. 2007) (displaying results
of alternative extrapolation models for the same data points on dose-response curve for tests to assess
carcinogenicity of chemical in mice). “[U]nderstanding the strengths and weaknesses of any particular
25
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Thus, as Wendy Wagner has explained, “not only must policymakers gather available
positive knowledge, but they also must appreciate where this information leaves off and
the various, scattered uncertainties begin. In fact, determining the nature and importance
of these various knowledge gaps is an unusually esoteric inquiry” that involves a mix of
science and policy issues.27 Moreover, although some questions are posed in terms that
may appear to be entirely scientific — such as whether a given level of exposure to a
pollutant is safe, or whether a proposed activity will “jeopardize” an endangered species
— their resolution inevitably requires the decisionmaker to make policy judgments,
regardless of the breadth of scientific information available.28
Thus, in many situations in which Congress has required agencies to justify their
decisions on “scientific” grounds, the existence of scientific uncertainty prevents the
agency from restricting the factors it considers to those that are exclusively scientific.
Although an agency’s consideration of available scientific knowledge in these contexts
may help to “legitimize” its decisions, the agency cannot avoid the need to make value
judgments and policy determinations in reaching its ultimate conclusion about whether to
permit a certain activity with potential adverse effects on the environment to proceed and,
if so, to what extent.29
B.

Accommodating Bounded Rationality in Environmental Policy
Decisions

Faced with the impossibility of eliminating scientific uncertainty, both Congress
and the federal agencies responsible for protecting the environment and preserving the
nation’s natural resource base have taken steps to accommodate bounded rationality,
while retaining a science-based focus for addressing environmental problems. Some of
the federal environmental laws require that agencies base their decisions on the “best
available science,” thereby recognizing that complete information may never be
available. In such situations, the statutes charge the agencies with doing the best they can
to mine the information that it is practical to obtain before discharging their statutory
responsibilities. Some agencies, including the Forest Service, have interpreted statutory

model is essential to understanding the relevance of specific target organ toxicities to what would be
expected in humans.” Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable Patterns of
Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is There A Need for Liability Reform?, 64-AUT. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
5, 33 (2001).
27
Wagner, supra note 20, at 193.
28
In deciding whether a given level of exposure to pollution is safe, for example, an agency may have to
decide whether it is “safe” for humans to experience an excess risk of contracting cancer of one in a million
or one in 100,000. The agency will have to make that policy determination even if it has epidemiological
data upon which it may make an accurate assessment of the risk of exposure.
29
Tarlock, supra note 5, at 142-43. See also RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
224 (2004) (asserting that “[s]cience will not supply the fixed standard for what constitutes the appropriate
level of ecosystem protection for simple application by environmental lawmakers”); DAVID SCHOENBROD,
SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON: HOW CONGRESS GRABS POWER, SHIRKS
RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES THE PEOPLE 69 (2005) (contending that the “finely calibrated
techniques” of science “provide no right answer to many questions of the greatest [environmental] policy
consequence”).
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provisions requiring that decisions be based on science as permitting decisionmaking
based on the best available science.
Agencies also have frequently accommodated bounded rationality by resorting to
simulation techniques such as modeling and the use of surrogates. Reliance on modeling
or surrogates allows the decisionmaker relying on these techniques to extrapolate from
known information to realms of uncertainty, thereby plugging data gaps that otherwise
might have prevented the decisionmaker from justifying its decisions in scientific terms.
The remainder of this part describes these techniques for accommodating bounded
rationality. Part III analyzes the efforts of the Forest Service to use best available science
mandates, modeling, and surrogates to carry out its responsibility under the NFMA to
protect plant and animal diversity in the national forests.
1.

“Best Available Science” Mandates

Provisions requiring that federal environmental and natural resource management
agencies base their decisions on consideration of the “best available science” are
common. Perhaps the best known of these is the provision of the ESA requiring the
Interior and Commerce Departments to base their decisions on whether or not to list a
species as endangered or threatened “solely on the basis of the best scientific and
commercial data available.”30 But Congress has used the same or similar language in a
variety of other pollution control and natural resource management statutes.31
Although Congress has never defined the term “best available science” in any of
the environmental statutes in which that term is used,32 it has explicitly recognized in
directing that agencies make decisions on that basis that the optimal amount of scientific
evidence for making the decision involved may not be available.33 As Holly Doremus
has explained, a “best available science” mandate may serve multiple purposes. These
include ensuring that an agency’s decisions accurately reflect known scientific
information, imposing a mandate on the agency to make its best efforts to ferret out
available information,34 placing an imprimatur of objectivity on agency decisions to
30

16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
See Michael J. Brennan et al., Square Pegs and Round Holes: Application of the “Best Scientific Data
Available” Standard in the Endangered Species Act, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 402-03 (2003) (citing
various federal and state laws, including the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
and the Magnuson-Stevens Act); Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act:
Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1033-34 (1997) [cited hereinafter
as Doremus, Listing Decisions] (listing natural resource management statutes that use variants of the “best
available science” terminology). See also A. W. Harris, The Best Scientific Evidence Available: The
Whaling Moratorium and Divergent Interpretations of Science, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
375 (2005) (discussing efforts by the International Whaling Commission to limit whaling).
32
Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note 31, at 1033-34. See also Brennan, supra note 31, at 390 (stating
that, although Congress placed a “near-talismanic reliance” on the use of the best available science in the
ESA, it “failed to provide guidance on how to determine whether particular data meets this standard”).
33
Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note 31, at 1075.
34
“[T]he ESA's best available science mandate might impose . . . an affirmative obligation to find data,
rather than to simply evaluate what others present. A few courts have interpreted the [ESA’s] best
31
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increase public trust and enhance the agency’s credibility,35 and creating a basis for
resolving judicial challenges to agency decisions.36 Ultimately, it is possible for the
adoption of a statutory or regulatory mandate that an agency base its decisions solely on
the “best available science” to make it harder for environmental agencies to weaken
environmental and natural resource protection mechanisms by relying on political
opposition or on factors, such as economic considerations, that tend to cut against
stringent pollution control requirements or meaningful constraints on natural resource
development.37
2.

Modeling and Reliance on Surrogates

The environmental and natural resource management agencies have sought to
accommodate bounded rationality in two other, related ways. First, agencies have
created models that enable them to predict the impacts of their decisions on the
environment by simulating real world conditions. Second, they have focused their
available science mandate to impose precisely such an obligation,” although some have refused to do so.
Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science
Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 424 (2004) [cited hereinafter as Doremus, Best Available Science Mandate].
Compliance with a mandate to engage in the agency’s best efforts could involve a change in the ways in
which the agency accumulates or interprets scientific information, such as engaging in peer review before
determining whether to credit a particular piece of evidence. Id. at 432-33.
35
Professor Doremus has explained:
When they first developed the best available science mandate, legislators and regulators alike
might well have believed that it would increase public acceptance of ESA decisions. People are
more likely to accept outcomes that prove unfavorable to their interests when they trust the
motives of the actor. The apparent objectivity of science seems ideally suited to enhancing trust.
It is no surprise, therefore, that politicians have often cloaked decisions made on other grounds in
the garb of science.
Id. at 426-27. In addition, Professor Doremus speculates that a “best available science” mandate may have
the effect, if not the purpose, of shifting decisionmaking authority within the agency from political
appointees to scientists, many of whom are likely to be career employees. If such a shift were to occur, it
might actually result in a decisionmaking process that relies more heavily on objective assessments of
scientific evidence and less on raw political determinations.
36
A best available science mandate might prompt more deferential substantive review if the courts are
inclined to defer to an agency’s scientific and technical determinations. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983) (enunciating deferential standard of judicial
review of agency technical determinations). On the other hand, a “best available science” mandate may
provide a basis for a court to scrutinize the agency’s explanation to determine whether it has adequate
support in the record. See Doremus, Best Available Science Mandate, supra note 34, at 430; Brennan et al.,
supra note 31, at 412 (stating that “many courts applying the best scientific data available standard under
the ESA have imposed an affirmative obligation on the agency to explain why, when faced with two
contradictory scientific conclusions, it chooses one over the other”).
37
See, e.g., Doremus, Best Available Science Mandate, supra note 34, at 435-36:
[T]he best available science mandate may be playing a vital role in stiffening agencies'
conservation backbones. It prevents the agencies from openly making decisions based on the
costs of conservation or expected political opposition. Undoubtedly, expected economic and
political costs still figure in, but they cannot be openly acknowledged as the basis for a decision.
Decisions must be scientifically defensible, even if other unacknowledged factors contribute to
them. The mere suggestion that a decision expressly considered political or economic factors can
make judicial reversal more likely.
See also Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 4, at 22 (arguing that the ESA’s “best available science” mandate
amounts to “a finger on the scale, of some indeterminate size, on the side of the species”).
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analysis on a small component of a particular human-nature interaction and used it as a
surrogate for the larger problem to which they are responding or which they are
attempting to manage. The two mechanisms for accommodating bounded rationality are
interrelated because one of the primary challenges for modelers is to “find reliable
surrogate variables to permit the [agency] to ‘scale up’ the more finely scaled
measurements researchers typically collect.”38 Simulation techniques can facilitate
decisionmaking in the face of scientific uncertainty by allowing agencies to extrapolate
from observed data to situations in which apparently crucial information is missing.
Modeling exercises cannot eliminate uncertainty, however, and they create a risk that
those conducting the modeling exercise can mask value judgments behind a façade of
technical objectivity.
a.

The Ubiquity of Modeling in Environmental Policymaking

Modeling and other simulation techniques have become important components of
policymaking in many fields, including environmental law.39 Modeling is an integral part
of the process of the implementation of pollution control statutes. The federal Clean Air
Act (CAA) is perhaps the best example of the wide variety of uses to which modeling
may be put in efforts by federal and state agencies to minimize risks to public health and
the environmental resulting from pollution. Both the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and state agencies have relied on modeling to designate air
quality control regions under the program for achieving the national ambient air quality
standards (NAAQS).40 EPA has used models to establish emission limitations for
individual sources of air pollution in crafting nationally uniform emission standards for
stationary sources41 and state pollution control agencies have done so in developing state
implementation plans (SIPs) for achieving the NAAQS.42 Indeed, the CAA requires that
38

Fred L. Bunnell & Mark Boyland, Decision–Support Systems: It’s the Question Not the Model, 10 J. FOR
NATURE CONSERVATION 269, 274 (2003). Bunnell and Boyland add:
The advantages gained in assisting management emphasize the importance of developing reliable,
interim surrogate variables for those portions of the real world amenable for aggregation. When
we make decisions we incorporate only a few variables effectively. Again it is apparent that the
largest benefit gained from the system is in thinking through the questions, variables, and choices
carefully.
Id.
39
See, e.g., Antje Kann & John P. Weyant, Approaches for Performing Uncertainty Analysis in LargeScale Energy/Economic Policy Models, 5 ENVTL. MODELING AND ASSESSMENT 29, 29 (1999) (asserting
that, “[w]ith rapid advances in computing power over the last decade, large-scale models have become
essential to decision making in public policy”).
40
See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding, however, that modeling
exercise was based on erroneous data). See generally Bruce M. Kramer, Air Quality Modeling: Judicial,
Legislative and Administrative Reactions, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 236 (1979).
41
See, e.g., Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding new source
performance standards based on extrapolation of one industry’s performance to another industry). Cf. 42
U.S.C. § 7412(k)(3)(D) (authorizing the use of modeling in the development of a national strategy for
controlling emission of hazardous air pollutants in urban areas).
42
See, e.g., BCCA Appeal Group v. EPA, 355 F.3d 817 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding EPA's reliance on
photochemical grid model in approving Texas's demonstration that Houston SIP would achieve attainment
of ozone NAAQS, despite the model's inability to replicate the city's unique meteorological conditions);
Pan Am. Grain Mfg. Co. v EPA, 95 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1996); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d
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certain demonstrations that an SIP will provide for attainment of the NAAQS be based on
photochemical grid modeling or similar analytical techniques approved by EPA.43 The
agencies have relied on models to decide whether to issue permits specifying emission
limitations and to establish the limitations set forth in those permits.44 Models also have
been used to assist in the implementation of emissions trading programs.45
Modeling is also potentially useful in protecting other resources from the adverse
effects of pollution. Modeling can provide a basis for predicting the impact of oil spills
and hazardous substance releases on groundwater quality.46 Models are used in
conducting risk assessments to determine the potential carcinogenicity of tested chemical
substances to extrapolate the dose-response data obtained in high-dose animal tests to the
levels of likely human exposure, for which there is no data or insufficient data.47

660 (6th Cir. 1978); Ohio v. EPA, 784 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1986); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA,
572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1978). See also Michael S. McMahon & Steven D. Hinkle, Note, State of Ohio v.
EPA: Does the Sixth Circuit Have A New Standard for Its Review of the EPA’s Use of Air Quality
Modeling ?, 18 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 569 (1987).
43
42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(2)(A). In Envtl. Def. v. EPA, 369 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2004), the court interpreted the
statute as requiring only that grid modeling form the “foundation and principal component of the attainment
demonstration.” See also Sierra Club v. EPA, 356 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (construing § 7511a(c)(2)(A)
as allowing EPA to adjust results of photochemical grid modeling to assure consistency with real-world
observations as a means of demonstrating attainment of ozone NAAQS).
44
See, e.g., Sur Contra La Contaminacion v. EPA, 202 F.3d 443 (1st Cir. 2000); Northern Plains Res.
Council v. EPA, 645 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981). See generally James A. Westbrook, Air Dispersion
Modeling: Tools to Assess Impacts from Pollution Sources, 13 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 546 (Spring
1999).
45
See generally Camille V. Otero-Phillips, What’s in the Forecast? A Look at the EPA’s Use of Computer
Models In Emissions Trading, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 187 (1998).
46
See generally Michael Sklash et al., Groundwater Models: Can You Believe What They Are Saying?, 13
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 542 (Spring 1999).
47
See, e.g., John S. Applegate & Celia Campbell-Mohn, Risk Assessment: Science, Law and Policy, 14
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 219, 220 (2000) (explaining that epidemiologists “must rely on animal testing to
estimate the likelihood that cancer will be induced at a given level of exposure” and that “[t]o predict the
dose response in humans at low levels of exposure over long periods of time, risk assessors must use
theoretical models because direct observation is impossible”); Michael Schon, Comment, Susceptible
Children: Why the EPA’s New Risk Assessment Guidelines for Children Fail to Protect America’s Future,
36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 701, 704 (2004) (stating that “risk assessment creates an equation that allows regulators to
predict what the probable risk of cancer would be when people are exposed to a chemical at a particular
level or concentration,” that, “[i]n formulating this equation, . . . the EPA makes assumptions and develops
mathematical models to fill in gaps (or ‘uncertainties’) caused from lack of scientific knowledge,” and that
risk assessment therefore “blends scientific knowledge with probabilistic assumptions”); Vern R. Walker,
The Myth of Science as a “Neutral Arbiter” For Triggering Precautions, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 197,
209-10 (2003) (stating that “[t]oxicologists and exposure modelers often use linear regression models to
characterize the incremental contributions of multiple hazards (e.g., asbestos exposure and cigarette
smoking) to the total risk of an adverse effect (e.g., lung cancer)” and that “scientists use a variety of
mathematical models to characterize the quantitative relationships among multiple variables”); Peter C.
Wright et al., Twenty-Five Years of Cancer Risk Assessment, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 31, 34 (Spring
2005) (explaining that “EPA has for many years employed the multistage dose-extrapolation model, which
generally predicts the highest cancer risk of all the most commonly used models and then increases the
prediction of risk by estimating the statistical upper bound on the best estimate of the multistage model at
low doses”); Thomas R. Head, III, PCBs — The Rise and Fall of an Industrial Miracle, 19 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 15, 18 (Spring 2005).
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The federal agencies responsible for managing publicly owned lands and
resources also commonly engage in modeling exercises. The Coastal Zone Management
Act explicitly authorizes modeling to assess water quality in coastal waters and the Great
Lakes.48 The Fish and Wildlife Service uses modeling to assist in listing and delisting
decisions,49 in designating critical habitats, 50 and in allowing incidental takings under the
ESA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act.51 Land management agencies such as the
National Park Service also rely on modeling exercises to assist in the development of
standards to guide decisions on which uses to permit or prohibit.52 These agencies,
among others, also use modeling in the preparation of environmental assessments and
environmental impact statements under NEPA.53
b.

The Benefits of Modeling

A model has been defined as “a tool used to simulate some aspect of the real
world” or as “a simplified representation of some aspect of the real world” that allows
its user to accomplish a “purposeful reduction of a mass of information to a manageable
size and shape.”55 Some models or other proxies for reality seek to extrapolate data from
small-scale phenomena (such as the effects of a timber harvest on a single animal
species) to predict the effects on a larger whole (such as an ecosystem in which the single
species lives). Others use observations on a relatively large scale (such as the observed
effects of exposing laboratory animals to maximum tolerated doses of toxic chemicals) to
predict the effects of smaller-scale activity (such as the effects of low-level human
54

48

16 U.S.C.A. § 1451(g)(2)(B) (requiring evaluation of “research programs on the causes, characteristics,
and impacts of hypoxia, including recommendations of how to eliminate significant gaps in hypoxia
modeling and monitoring data”).
49
See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designating the Greater Yellowstone
Ecosystem Population of Grizzly Bears as a Distinct Population Segment; Removing the Yellowstone
Distinct Population Segment of Grizzly Bears From the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,854, 69,859 (Nov. 17, 2005).
50
See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the Bull
Trout, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,212, 56,237 (Sept. 26, 2005).
51
See, e.g., Marine Mammals; Incidental Take During Specified Activities, 68 Fed Reg. 66,744, 66,745
(Nov. 28, 2003) (discussing model that simulated the effects of oil spills on estimated polar bear survival in
the Beaufort Sea).
52
See, e.g., Clarification of the Term the Day in the Definition of Substantial Restoration , 68 Fed. Reg.
63,129, 63,130 (Nov. 7, 2003) (discussion of computer modeling for analyzing effects of aircraft operations
on noise levels within the Grand Canyon).
53
See, e.g., Utah Envtl. Cong. V. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1140 (10th Cir. 2007) (describing the Forest
Service’s use of two computer models to calculate the amount of expected runoff resulting from timber sale
project and the effect on stream channels); Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1031-32 (9th Cir.
2005) (challenge to the Forest Service’s use of the Water and Sediment Yields (WATSED) model for
assessing cumulative effects of timber harvest projects on in-stream sedimentation); Basin Creek Fuels
Reduction Project, Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest, Silver Bow, County, MT, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,906,
17,906 (Apr. 14, 2003) (discussing use of fire simulation models to determine where fuels treatments
would be the most effective in slowing fire while minimizing the number of acres needing to be treated);
Phase II Amendment of Black Hills National Forest Land and Resource Management, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,406,
59,406 (Nov. 28, 2001) (referring to recalculation of allowable timber sale quantity and other forest outputs
based on Forest Vegetation Simulator (FVS), Habitat Capability (HABCAP), and spatial analysis models).
54
Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 903 n.1.
55
Id. (quoting EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 8 (1978)).
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exposure to those chemicals).56 Models serve as “decision support systems” that both
simplify the physical reality being analyzed and translate observed results into
predictions that would not be available simply by observing that reality.57 Models can
increase the analyst’s understanding of the relationships at issue (e.g., between a timber
sale and its impact on biological diversity) by combining or presenting data in a way that
provides new insights or extends those relationships beyond the range of observed
measurement. If the predictions provided by a model turn out to conform to subsequently
observed real world developments, the modelers gain confidence in the accuracy of the
assumptions upon which the model is based concerning the relationships between human
activities and environmental effects.58
Models are particularly well suited to large-scale planning efforts. Because they
are capable of “represent[ing] mathematically complex chemical, physical and social
relationships,” they allow planners “to make predictions and test assumptions in ways
that otherwise would not be possible. Not surprisingly, models have become essential
and ubiquitous planning tools, our dependence upon them making their abandonment all
but unthinkable.”59 Two observers recently described the attractiveness of modeling to
planners in the following terms:
Policymakers often must predict outcomes of complicated processes, and making
those predictions would be all but impossible without models. Complex
environmental systems often involve more variables, data, and interdependent
feedback processes than people reasonably can organize in their minds, and
interactions within these systems may create counterintuitive, nonlinear responses
that are impossible to understand without models. Models can organize,
manipulate, and process vast quantities of data and can simulate complex
multivariable processes, and these capacities allow them to predict the future,
compare alternative possible futures, test the ramifications of assumptions, and
contribute to improved understanding of system interactions. These powers are
invaluable in planning efforts.60
Moreover, modeling is an efficient analytical technique because it reduces the time and
expense needed to gather information, even when acquiring the relevant data through

56

See Rose, supra note 1, at 291 (asserting that policymakers extrapolate both from large to small and vice
versa, but that “the large-to-small extrapolation . . . is especially common in environmental policy”). For a
discussion of the validity of conducting animal tests for carcinogenesis at maximum tolerated doses, see
GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 722-24.
57
Bunnell & Boyland, supra note 35, at 270. See also Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 912 (“models allow
scientific knowledge to be codified and standardized”).
58
Bunnell & Boyland, supra note 38, at 272-73.
59
Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 904.
60
Id. at 912-13. See also Hanna J. Cortner & Dennis L. Schweitzer, Institutional Limits and Legal
Implications of Quantitative Models in Forest Planning, 13 ENVTL. L. 493, 497 (1983) (arguing that
“[q]uantitative analytical procedures are necessary to utilize fully data describing complex situations.
Computers make the use of sophisticated mathematical models possible. They provide the mechanism to
organize and manipulate data, to formulate and project management alternatives into the future, and to
assess physical and socioeconomic implications.”).
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real-world experiments and observation rather through simulation exercises is both
possible and ethically appropriate.61
c.

The Limits of Modeling

Modeling and other simulation techniques (such as the use of surrogate variables
to represent more complicated relationships between human activities and the resulting
environmental effects) allow environmental and natural resource management agencies to
make decisions, despite the presence of scientific uncertainty about some aspects of those
relationships. They allow agencies whose statutory mandates compel decisions based on
science to make decisions even when significant scientific information does not yet exist,
or at least when that information is not currently available to the agency. Models do not
eliminate uncertainty, however, and may even exacerbate it if the models provide a
distorted representation of the real world. Nor, despite their façade of objectivity, do
models eliminate the subjective component of environmental decisionmaking or prevent
agencies from making value judgments. Finally, the technical nature of modeling
exercises may shield the agency’s assumptions and value judgments from public scrutiny,
thereby precluding meaningful public participation in agency decisionmaking processes.
Models allow decisionmakers to simulate reality in situations in which direct
observations of the phenomenon being analyzed are either impossible or impractical.62
Models, however, are only “placeholders for reality.”63 They are capable neither of
providing a completely accurate representation of reality nor of eliminating the scientific
uncertainty that induces the decisionmaker to resort to modeling in the first place.64
Errors in the design and application of models are common, but may not be easy to
discover. The inability of models to provide perfect replications of reality becomes a
problem if the administrative agencies using the models to make decisions fail either to
recognize or acknowledge these imperfections. If they fail to recognize them, they may
continue to rely on models that provide flawed output. The result may be that the agency
61

See Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 913. The authors state:
Policymakers rarely can perform real-world experiments; large-scale experiments upon the
environment are generally prohibitively time-consuming and expensive, and the threat of human
injury or irreparable environmental harm makes some experimentation ethically suspect at best.
Models avoid these problems by performing their tasks in controlled settings, without
experimentation upon the actual environment. [Although g]athering model input data can require
extensive effort — indeed, data gathering is often the most expensive and time-consuming task in
a modeling study. . . the financial costs of modeling, while often quite large in actual dollar terms,
can pale in comparison to the costs of other planning methods.
62
Cf. Sklash, supra note 46, at 542 (defining a model as “any simulation of a real thing”).
63
Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Legal Aspects of the Regulatory Use of Environmental
Modeling, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10751, 10763 (2003).
64
See Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 904; id. at 922 (contending that, because “no model can incorporate
all real data or simulate all of the processes that might influence an outcome” and “every model is
necessarily an approximation of reality, models' predictions unavoidably contain some error”). Uncertainty
in models take two forms: “parametric uncertainty, which arises due to imperfect knowledge,” and
“stochasticity, which is due to inherent variability in certain processes.” Kann & Weyant, supra note 39, at
30. Whereas the first kind of uncertainty decreases over time as scientists accumulate additional factual
knowledge, “stochastic uncertainty is not reduced over time” because “natural variability will always
occur.” Id.
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makes decisions that conflict with governing statutory criteria or with the agency’s own
stated goals.65 The limitations on data that initially prompted resort to the models may
hinder the modelers’ ability to assess whether the models are working in the intended
manner.66 If an agency using simulation techniques is aware of modeling flaws but fails
to disclose them, not only may the decisions based on the model deviate from statutory
norms, but affected entities and the public at large may have difficulty discovering the
deviation.
Models not only fail to provide complete representations of objective reality. By
their very nature, they are also incapable of providing analysis that is entirely objective,
although they may be perceived in that manner.67 Models are built upon assumptions.
Those assumptions inevitably reflect value judgments. These value judgments can affect
the selection of a model from among several alternatives, the design of the model, and the
manner in which modeling results are interpreted and communicated.68 If toxicologists
use models to provide estimates of the risk of getting cancer as a result of long-term, lowlevel exposure to cancer-causing substances, for example, they may assume that there is
no safe level of exposure in the absence of data to the contrary. Alternatively, they may
take the position that the absence of data demonstrating a risk at low levels of exposure
should be interpreted as evidence that a safe threshold level of exposure exists at the
lowest point on the dose-response curve at which known adverse effects have occurred.
The choice between these two competing assumptions requires the analyst or
policymaker to make a judgment call. The first assumption reflects a decision to err on
the side of safety, while the second may be based on a desire not to restrict economically
productive activity that creates potentially carcinogenic exposures in the absence of a
demonstrable threat to the public health. Similarly, a model that seeks to compare the
costs and benefits of implementing an environmental protection measure will have to
incorporate a discount rate to compute the number (and perhaps the value) of lives saved
in the future and the costs that will result from alternative levels of regulation.69
The necessity of making value judgments in the design of models or other
simulation techniques is not problematic, as along as those judgments are disclosed so the
impacts of those judgments on the modeling results can be assessed. As two observers of
the use of modeling by the Forest Service have put it:
65
See, e.g., Falk Huetmann, Databases and Science-Based Management in the Context of Wildlife and
Habitat: Toward a Certified ISO Standard for Objective Decision-Making for the Global Community by
Using the Internet, 69 J. OF WILDLIFE MGMT. 466, ___ (April 2005) (stating that “[d]ecisions based on soft
foundations can harm wildlife and habitat and threaten future survival”).
66
See Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 924-25.
67
See Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 60, at 516 (contending that “[v]alue-laden considerations permeate
both the formulation of the model and the application of model results” and that “[q]uantitative models are
subject to the same qualitative and subjective influences as the beyond-the-model portion of the decision
process”).
68
See Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 927-29.
69
See Kann & Weyant, supra note 39, at 30 (referring to policy choices about protecting future generations
involved in the selection of a discount rate); id. at 29 (stating that different underlying assumptions, such as
how to value a human life, can lead to widely varying results among different models). See generally Lisa
Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling,
Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39 (1999).
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Values are unavoidable. The use of quantitative planning models, specifying
ways of doing things in a reproducible manner and seeking to substitute
mathematical algorithms for intuitive judgments, appears to make the planning
process more rational and scientific. The danger is that the planning agency, the
courts, and the public may all lose sight of where and how these unavoidable
values enter quantitative models and the impact they have on the use of analytical
results.70
Indeed, the value judgments reflected in quantitative models may be les
problematic than those built into nonquantitative scientific hypotheses based on analogies
or metaphors, provided the modeler discloses the algorithm upon which the model is
based. The underlying assumptions of a mathematical model may be more easily
examined, assessed for potential bias, and falsified than the less visible assumptions and
value judgments built into a non-mathematical model. One criterion for determining
whether an analytical technique qualifies as “scientific” is whether the theories upon
which it proceeds are falsifiable.71 To the extent that a quantitative model lends itself
more readily to falsification, its use fits more comfortably within the framework of
scientific analysis than an analogical model whose underlying assumptions are hidden.
According to some who have analyzed science-based decisionmaking by the
federal land management agencies, the use of modeling by those agencies is susceptible
to the criticism that the agencies, intentionally or not, have masked their value judgments
in the language of technical determinations. As a result, “outsiders are frequently unable
to discover exactly what [the Forest Service has] done or to determine if bias has crept
into analysis. For example, management activities thought to be undesirable might be
eliminated from consideration without explicit analysis, or constraints judged overly
restrictive relaxed to give the decisionmaker a greater range of discretion.”72 Decisions
by the Interior Department’s Fish and Wildlife Service and the Commerce Department’s
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries under the ESA have
provoked a similar charge:
Rather than achieving either value-neutral or politically invulnerable
decisionmaking, the strictly science mandate [of § 4 of the ESA] has encouraged
the listing agencies to devise an inscrutable listing policy hidden behind a wall
70

Cortner & Scweitzer, supra note 60, at 495-96. See also Doremus, Constitutive Law, supra note 1, at
334-35:
The obsessive search for objective bases for decisions also creates a temptation to disguise nonobjective decisions as scientific, a practice that skews the political process and can interfere with
our ability to achieve our real goals. Where science or economics cannot provide the answers that
policy decisions require, seemingly objective criteria are more likely to hide than to overcome the
biases of decisionmakers, and are not likely to produce consistent or predictable decisions.
71
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (quoting KARL POPPER,
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) (“[T]he
criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability”) (emphasis
deleted).)”
72
Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 60, at 503.
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labeled science. The mandate has produced listing decisions which are often
incomprehensible even to informed observers, and nearly inaccessible to the
general public.73
d.

Judicial Review of Model-Based Decisionmaking by
Environmental and Natural Resource Management
Agencies

Litigants have challenged decisions by environmental agencies based on the use
of models, surrogates, or other simulation techniques. In some of these cases, the
challengers have asserted procedural errors in the agency’s decisionmaking process,
while in others the litigants have claimed that the decisions were substantively flawed.
In reviewing challenges to the use of agency models, the courts in environmental
cases have recognized the importance of disclosing and providing an opportunity to
comment upon the model’s assumptions.74 “In particular, the Agency must provide clear
notice of the possibility that it will rely upon a particular model and provide sufficient
information about that model to allow the public to comment upon its use of the model in
the rulemaking proceeding.”75 In one case, the D.C. Circuit rejected the claim that EPA
failed to afford adequate notice of its intention to rely on a model in deciding whether to
list a substance as hazardous air pollutant under the CAA. It found that EPA had
explained the basis for the model in the notice of proposed rulemaking, set forth its
rationale for making various assumptions, requested comments on those assumptions,
addressed significant comments in documents that accompanied the final rule, and made
revisions in modeling parameters based upon the comments it received.76 As long as the
agency follows these steps, the courts are unlikely to invalidate the agency’s model-based
decision on the ground that it failed to provide proper notice of the model’s role in the
decisionmaking process.77

73

Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note 31, at 1129.
In Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005), the court held that the Forest Service violated
NEPA by approving a timber harvest as part of a watershed restoration project. In particular, the court
found that the agency’s “heavy reliance” on the WATSED model to analyze the cumulative effects of
timber harvests on in-stream sedimentation violated NEPA
because there was inadequate disclosure that the model's consideration of relevant variables is
incomplete. Moreover, the Forest Service knew that WATSED had shortcomings, and yet did not
disclose these shortcomings until the agency's decision was challenged on the administrative
appeal. We hold that this withholding of information violated NEPA, which requires up-front
disclosures of relevant shortcomings in the data or models.
Id. at 1032.
75
McGarity & Wagner, supra note 63, at 10755. See also Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 911 (stating that
“[t]he judiciary does acknowledge an obligation to carefully review the procedural integrity of agency
decision-making” that is based on the use of models).
76
Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
77
See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 63, at 10756 (stating that “an EPA modeling exercise conducted in
the context of notice-and-comment rulemaking should not suffer reversal on notice grounds if the Agency
is careful to describe the model in some detail; identify the assumptions upon which the model relies;
explain why those assumptions are valid in the particular context in which it is applying the model; and
specifically request comments on the validity of the assumptions and their use in the modeling exercise”).
74

U:\Word\articles\NFMA data gaps ssrn.doc
glicksman

Page 17

7/13/2007

To be published at 83 Indiana L.J., Issue # 2
Substantive challenges to an agency’s use of modeling in environmental
decisionmaking typically face an uphill battle. The courts have been wary of secondguessing the manner in which the environmental agencies have interpreted and applied
science.78 They also have recognized that, in many environmental decisionmaking
contexts, the use of modeling is essential to the ability of the agency to implement its
statutory responsibilities.79 As a result, judicial review of agency modeling decisions has
tended to be very deferential.80 The courts typically have not been impressed by claims
that an agency chose the wrong model from among competing alternative models,81 that
deficiencies in the data the agency plugged into the model invalidated the results,82 that
the model did not accurately predict or was not capable of actually predicting real world
results,83 or that the agency should have deferred its decision until it could accumulate
more information instead of relying on modeling results.84
78

See, e.g., id. at 10757 (claiming that “[t]he general rule for the courts' substantive review of technical
models under the informal rulemaking provisions of the APA is deference to the agency's technical and
policy choices as long as the agency explains its choices, especially the controverted ones, in an accessible
and complete way”); Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 911-12 (asserting that “[r]espect for agencies’
interpretations of science . . . [has] become deeply institutionalized within the judiciary” and that
“[d]eference to agency judgment is a core element of judicial review of environmental decisions, and
judicial opinions are filled with statements about how agencies, not judges, hold technical expertise”).
79
See Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 915 (quoting Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 332 (D.C. Cir.
1981)) (stating that, “[r]ealistically, computer modeling is a useful and often essential tool for performing
the Herculean labors Congress imposed on EPA in the Clean Air Act”). One court assessed the utility of
groundwater flow modeling as a technique for helping to allocate the costs of responding to groundwater
contamination among multiple responsible parties as follows:
If properly used, computer models appear to be an invaluable tool in approximating the
complexities of underground fluid flow. Without these models, the scientists and engineers would
be limited to guessing at sources and fluid flow characteristics based on the limited number of
wells that penetrate the aquifer. Through modeling, reservoir flow and contaminant transport can
be calculated using complex mathematical operations that simulate the aquifer characteristics.
From that effort, the model can simulate the progression of contaminant plumes from each source,
thereby providing an estimate of the size of each plume at any given time. Unfortunately, there
are no true crystal balls − the models are only as good as the data placed into them. In this case,
the data inputs and methods for configuring the models provided fertile ground for disagreement.
Nonetheless, the court concludes that computer modeling of plume size is an appropriate basis for
allocating costs.
City of Wichita v. Tr. of the Apco Liquidating Trust, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1106-07 (D. Kan. 2003).
80
Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 4, at 19 (stating that “[s]cientific judgments are generally set aside only
in the most egregious situations, as when it is clear that there is a major inconsistency between the
underlying information and the ultimate conclusion”).
81
See, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1978).
82
See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 63, at 10765.
83
See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v.
EPA, 578 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978); Oceana, Inc. v. Evans, 384 F. Supp. 2d 203, 221 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding
that model used to assess impact of scallop fishing on turtles bore a reasonable relationship to the reality it
purported to represent, despite uncertainties in its application), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oceana, Inc. v.
Gutierrez, 179 Fed. Appx. 703 (D.C. Cir. 2006). But cf. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251,
1268 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating, in the course of holding that EPA violated the Energy Policy Act by
choosing a 10,000-year compliance period for its radiation-exposure standards, “that there is still
considerable uncertainty as to whether current modeling capability allows development of computer
models that will provide sufficiently meaningful and reliable projections over a time frame up to tens-ofthousands to hundreds-of-thousands of years,” and that “[s]imply because such models can provide
projections for those time periods does not mean those projections are meaningful and reliable enough to
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A case that illustrates the judicial inclination toward deference to agency
modeling choices involved an Indian tribe’s challenge to the Corps of Engineers’
decision to implement a flood control program in the Florida Everglades that entailed the
construction of structures such as pump stations and seepage reservoirs. The tribe
focused on the Corps’s failure to provide information to the FWS based on computer
modeling about the effect of the construction on endangered birds before the latter issued
its biological opinion on the program. According to the tribe, this failure violated the
ESA’s mandate that agencies use “the best scientific and commercial data available to
ensure the protection” of listed species.85 The court refused to find that the Corps
violated the ESA, concluding that it was appropriate to defer to the Corps’s decision “to
proceed with imperfect information.”86 The Corps did not act in an arbitrary and
capricious fashion by relying on limited modeling information, particularly because it
feared that awaiting the results of further modeling would allow additional damage to the
birds’ habitat to occur.87
The courts have invalidated agency decisions that relied on modeling or
simulation exercises, however, in cases in which they have found that a particular model
was ill-suited to the activities to which it was applied88 or that the agency was unable to
justify building the model on apparently arbitrary assumptions.89 Another ESA case
provides a natural resources law example of the willingness of the courts to reverse an
agency’s reliance on modeling or simulation techniques on these grounds. The ESA
allows the FWS to issue an incidental take statement (ITS)90 that allows federal agencies
to engage in activities that otherwise would have violated the ESA’s prohibition on the
taking of endangered species.91 When the FWS decides to issue an ITS, it must specify
establish a rational basis for regulatory decisionmaking”); Ohio v. EPA, 638 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1980)
(concluding that EPA’s reliance on air quality model was arbitrary in the absence of any effort to test the
model’s results against actual monitoring data).
84
See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 63, at 10765.
85
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
86
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
87
Id.
88
See, e.g., Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C Cir. 2000) (invalidating EPA decision
to establish zero-level maximum contaminant level goal under the Safe Drinking Water Act for chemical
based on application of linear, no-threshold model of carcinogenesis, despite existence of evidence that
there was a safe threshold level of exposure); Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 922
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (invalidating treatment standard for hazardous waste established by EPA under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act because the assumptions on which a test for determining whether
a waste is hazardous was based did not fit the situation to which EPA applied it; the court stated flatly that,
as EPA admitted, “the model does not work”); Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 2 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(concluding that EPA failed to demonstrate a rational relationship between test used to measure toxicity
and the mineral processing wastes to which it was applied).
89
See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that EPA
improperly listed a pollutant as a high-risk, hazardous air pollutant based on the use of a generic air
dispersion model that included assumptions that EPA conceded were not accurate for that particular
pollutant). See generally McGarity & Wagner, supra note 63, at 10759-61; Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at
915-16.
90
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).
91
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
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in the ITS, among other things, the amount of the incidental taking that is permitted.92
Although the courts have indicated that, ideally, that amount should take the form of a
specific number, they have allowed the FWS to substitute a “meaningful surrogate” for
the amount of the permissible incidental take if identification of a specific number is not
practical.93 In one case, the court held that the FWS violated the ESA by using ecological
conditions as a surrogate for the amount of the permissible incidental take because it
failed to establish a link between the conditions chosen by the FWS in the ITS and the
extent of the incidental taking that would be caused by the Bureau of Land
Management’s authorization of off-road vehicle use within the habitat of the listed
species.94
C.

Summary

The federal statutes that delegate authority to administrative agencies to protect
the environment from pollution or manage publicly owned land and resources require that
the agencies base many of their decisions on scientific determinations, and sometimes
require decisions to be based exclusively on scientific grounds. These mandates create
difficulties for the agencies when, as is often the case, the relevant scientific knowledge is
incomplete. Statutes that permit agencies to premise their decisions on the best available
science recognize that demanding that decisions be based on scientific certainty is a
chimerical objective in many environmental policy contexts. These statutes address the
reality of bounded rationality by requiring that agency decisions conform to the known
evidence and to reasonable extrapolations from that evidence. Best available science
mandates have the capacity to enhance public trust in agency decisions and provide a
standard for judicial review of those decisions.
The environmental and natural resource management agencies have reacted to
bounded rationality by adopting a variety of models and related techniques that permit
them to simulate the unknown effects of human activities subject to the agencies’
jurisdiction based on organization and manipulation of a relatively small and manageable
body of available information. These proxy regimes, like mandates that agencies act on
the basis of the best available evidence, may counter the tendency to defer making
decisions on important issues until agencies believe that they have mastered all aspects of
the particular problem being addressed.
Models and the use of other simulation techniques such as reliance on surrogates,
however, are incapable of eliminating bounded rationality, and may even exacerbate
preexisting uncertainty if they are built upon flawed input or if their output is improperly
interpreted or applied. By mandating that agencies act on the basis of the best available
scientific evidence, and by endorsing (explicitly or implicitly) the use of models,
92

50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a)(1)(i).
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1137-38 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(citing Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1249, 1250 (9th Cir.
2001)).
94
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. See also Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 2001) (reaching a similar result in the context of
an ITS for livestock management that would result in the incidental taking of the desert tortoise).
93
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Congress, in a variety of pollution control and natural resource management contexts, has
decided that the risks of doing nothing pending elimination of scientific uncertainty
outweigh the risks of erroneous action in the face of uncertainty.
The use of best available science mandates and modeling to address bounded
rationality has the potential to subvert the legislative agenda, however, if agencies abuse
their statutory discretion to proceed in the face of uncertainty by failing to disclose the
inevitable value judgments they must make when they engage in analytical efforts such
as modeling or by disguising such judgments in objective terminology. Some of the
decision in which the courts invalidated decisions that stemmed from the application of
models may provide examples of such failures.
The next part of this article explores how the Forest Service has reacted to
bounded rationality in its attempts to comply with its obligation under the NFMA to
protect the biological diversity of the national forests. The final part provides suggestions
for how to structure the Forest Service’s efforts to promote diversity using techniques
such as modeling and decisions based on the best available evidence so that the risk of
unaccountable decisionmaking and subversion of statutory goals is minimized.
III.

RELIANCE ON MODELING AND THE USE OF SURROGATES
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS

TO

PROTECT

The NFMA creates a planning process that requires the Forest Service, among
other things, to provide for the diversity of plant and animal communities in the national
forests.95 Part A below briefly describes the NFMA planning process as well as the
diversity protection component of that process. Part B explores several contexts in which
the Forest Service has used modeling to implement the NFMA’s planning provisions.
Part C explores in greater detail the approaches to implementation of the diversity
mandate reflected in the agency’s 1982, 2000, and 2005 land use planning regulations. In
particular, it describes the agency’s adoption of an approach to diversity protection that
relied on the identification and protection of management indicator species and the
subsequent abandonment of that approach and its replacement by a much vaguer, selfimposed “best available science” mandate. The discussion seeks to assess whether the
Forest Service has succeeded in crafting an approach to decisionmaking in the face of
scientific uncertainty that achieves the benefits of modeling and the use of surrogates
while avoiding some of the pitfalls described above.
A.

The National Forest Management Act’s Planning Process and the
Diversity Provision

Although the Forest Service engaged in planning efforts before the adoption of
the NFMA in 1976, that statute created a more detailed, congressionally directed
planning regime than had previously existed.96 Spurred in part by excessive use of
95

16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
Congress had previously directed the Forest Service to promulgate long-range, systemwide plans in the
Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974. 2 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS &

96

U:\Word\articles\NFMA data gaps ssrn.doc
glicksman

Page 21

7/13/2007

To be published at 83 Indiana L.J., Issue # 2
clearcutting practices, the NFMA planning provisions require the Forest Service to
prepare an assessment every ten years that describes the renewable resources in all of the
national forests,97 a program every five years that includes planning objectives over a
forty-year period for all Forest Service activities,98 and an annual report evaluating actual
activities in the national forests in relation to the program planning objectives.99
Of more direct relevance to this article are the provisions governing the planning
process for individual units of the NFS. The NFMA mandates that the Forest Service
develop, maintain, and revise as appropriate LRMPs for each unit of the NFS, using a
“systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical,
biological, economic, and other sciences.”100 The planning process for individual units of
the NFS entails three steps: the Forest Service’s promulgation of planning regulations,101
the adoption of land use plans for individual units that comport with the regulations,102
and the authorization of management actions (such as timber sales, grazing permits, or
special use permits for recreational uses) in conformity with the applicable plan.103
The NFMA specifies that the Forest Service’s planning regulations include
guidelines for insuring “consideration of the economic and environmental aspects of
various systems of renewable resource management” in protecting forest resources.104
The statute also requires that plans achieve the goals set forth in the five-year programs
by “provid[ing] for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the suitability
and capability of the specific land area in order to meet overall multiple-use
objectives.”105 The NFMA directs that, in promoting the substantive purposes of the
NFMA planning requirements, including the provision of plant and animal diversity, the
Forest Service appoint a committee of scientists to “provide scientific and technical
advice and counsel on proposed guidelines and procedures to assure that an effective
interdisciplinary approach is proposed and adopted.”106
The NFMA neither defines the term “diversity of plant and animal communities”
nor provides any yardstick for determining whether it exists.107 The absence of a
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 10F:29 (1990, updated periodically). The
most comprehensive discussion of the NFMA’s planning requirements for the national forests is Charles F.
Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1
(1985-86). See also Michael J. Gippert & Vincent L. DeWitte, The Nature of Land and Resource
Management Planning Under the National Forest Management Act, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 149 (1996).
97
16 U.S.C. § 1601(a).
98
16 U.S.C. § 1602.
99
16 U.S.C. § 1606(c). For additional description of all aspects of the NFMA planning process, see 2
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 96, at §§ 10F:31-10F:51.
100
16 U.S.C. § 1604(a)-(b).
101
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g).
102
16 U.S.C. § 1604(e).
103
The NFMA provides that “[r]esource plans and permits, contracts, and other instruments for the use and
occupancy of [NFS] lands shall be consistent with the land management plans.” 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i).
104
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(A).
105
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
106
16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1).
107
For a discussion of the justifications for preserving biological diversity, see Holly Doremus, Comment,
Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265 (1991). On
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definition may reflect Congress’s recognition of its lack of technical expertise and its
recognition that scientific understanding of the concept would evolve over time.108
Although the absence of a definition of diversity reflects a decision to afford the Forest
Service considerable discretion in pursuing the diversity mandate, the procedural
requirements that govern the planning process and the requirement that the agency seek
input from a Committee of Scientists it is required to appoint were to serve as constraints
on that discretion.109 The Forest Service in fact shaped its initial planning regulations,
adopted in 1982, to conform to the recommendations of the Committee. Among other
things, the Committee urged the Forest Service to adapt its approach to the preservation
of diversity to conform to advances in scientific understanding.110 One way to read the
statutory mandate to provide diversity is that it endorses ecosystem-based
management.111
B.

Modeling and the National Forest Management Act
1.

The Demand for Forest Service Modeling

The need for the Forest Service to engage in modeling exercises to implement its
planning responsibilities under the NFMA stems from bounded rationality. As two
observers described the situation just a year after the adoption of the Service’s 1982
NFMA planning regulations, “[t]he data required to satisfy [the NFMA’s] legal
requirements [for planning] are far beyond those ever compiled by the Forest Service or
anyone else. The Forest Service, therefore, relies on judgment to fill gaps in empirical
knowledge and on quantitative, computerized, systematic, and standardized analytical
procedures.”112 Similarly, a more recent analysis posits that:
The complexity of forest ecosystems allows scientists to possess detailed
knowledge of ecosystem processes for only a few locations where case studies
have been done. Thus, managers are often faced with making decisions that
affect an entire landscape with only rudimentary information on ecosystem
parameters for the vast majority of the area involved. Models that simulate forest

the many possible meanings of biodiversity, see Fred Bosselman, A Dozen Biodiversity Puzzles, 12 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 364 (2004).
108
See Greg D. Corbin, Comment, The United States Forest Service’s Response to Biodiversity Science, 29
ENVTL. L. 377, 380 (1999).
109
Id. at 380-81.
110
Id. at 381. For a description of the role of the Committee of Scientists in the promulgation of NFMA
planning regulations, see Brian Scott Pasko, Comment, The Great Experiment that Failed? Evaluating the
Role of A “Committee of Scientists” as A Tool for Managing and Protecting Our Public Lands, 32 ENVTL.
L. 509 (2002).
111
See Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Management, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 293, 309-10 (1994) (arguing that the diversity provision “incorporates conservation biology
considerations into the national forest planning and management process”).
112
Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 60, at 497. See also id. at 502 (asserting that NFMA planning
requirements “exceed the current state of knowledge about critical variables and their relationships. The
scientifically validated, empirical knowledge base underlying forest planning is typically, rather than
exceptionally, inadequate.”).
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succession under various conditions that may be of interest to managers often
require a higher level of detail.113
The process of compiling and analyzing the information necessary to conduct the kind of
planning envisioned by the NFMA has prompted the agency to rely on the use of
“quantitative, computerized, systematic, and standardized procedures. The quantitative
models the Forest Service has developed to meet the analytical requirements that flow
directly from the complexity of planning laws and regulations have become a central
feature of the current planning process in the United States.”114 By one account, an
inventory of simulation models available in 1993 for forest planning and ecosystem
management identified 250 different software tools.115
The Forest Service’s reliance on modeling programs did not convert the planning
process into a purely technocratic exercise, devoid of discretion and divorced from the
need to exercise judgment. As explained above, efforts to address bounded rationality
through modeling and similar regimes cannot eliminate the need to exercise judgment or
the need to make value judgments in selecting a particular model for a particular
analytical purpose, deciding what information to feed into the model, and interpreting the
results provided by the model.116 Moreover, land use planning generally and Forest
Service planning in particular involves a mix of technical expertise and value
judgments.117 According to one observer, despite “strenuous efforts to quantify
important ecological processes to support a body of theory in simulation model form, by
far the larger body of what we know can only be expressed qualitatively, comparatively,
and inexactly.”118
2.

The Forest Service’s Experience with Modeling

The Forest Service has long relied heavily on computer modeling in fulfilling its
planning responsibilities under the NFMA.119 For years, the Forest Service used a
computer program called FORPLAN (Forest Planning) in its planning efforts.
FORPLAN projected the possible production of goods and services from a NFS unit
under different management options. The agency entered a resource inventory into the
computer and used the program to calculate the forest’s “benchmark” capacity to produce
goods and services under options that included maximum commodity production,
maximum amenity value, and maximum present net market value. FORPLAN then
113

Tester et al., Modeling for Ecosystem Management in Minnesota Pine Forests, 80 BIOLOGICAL
CONSERVATION 313, 313 (1997).
114
Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 60, at 515-16.
115
H. Michael Rauscher, Ecosystem Management Decision Support for Federal Forests in the United
States: A Review, 114 FOREST ECOL. & MGMT. 173, 184 (1999).
116
See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
117
Cf. Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 60, at 499 (asserting that “planning is fundamentally a political
process that defines winners and losers rather than simply a technical enterprise to define truth”).
118
Rauscher, supra note 115, at 184.
119
See, e.g., Land and Resource Management Planning, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,807, 26,816 (1988) (referring to
“[v]arious analytical models such as FORPLAN, IMPLAN, simulation models, fire analysis models,
transportation analysis models, cost-benefit tools, and fish and wildlife habitat capability models [that] may
have been used during the planning process”).
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selected the management course that represented the greatest net public benefit.120 The
Forest Service eventually abandoned the use of the FORPLAN program when it
determined that it had become obsolete.121
For the most part, challenges to the Forest Service’s use of FORPLAN to comply
with its land use planning obligations met a hostile judicial reception. In an early attack
on a NFMA land use plan, a district court described FORPLAN as “a widely recognized
and respected planning tool generally accepted by the planning community.”122 The
Ninth Circuit rejected claims that the NFMA did not permit the Forest Service to base its
comparison of various management alternatives for grazing levels on FORPLAN analysis
derived from the use of management estimates as inputs into the computer program.
Holding that the agency did not act improperly, the court stated that “[i]t is enough that
there is evidence in the record that the grazing output levels were derived by professional
estimation and were not arbitrarily selected.”123 The same court later refused to overturn
a computer-generated conclusion that wilderness designation was inappropriate. The
court declared that it was not “in a position to prefer [the environmental group plaintiff’s]
view of the [Forest Service’s] software over the [Forest Service’s] explanation. [The
plaintiff] may well disagree with the substantive decisions informing the program design.
Nevertheless, it has given us no reason to doubt the Forest Service’s position.”124 Still
later, the Ninth Circuit, in rejecting the claim that a LRMP improperly authorized
grazing, disagreed with the contention that the Forest Service had improperly fed
“predetermined” grazing outcomes into its FORPLAN computer program. The court
characterized the attack as one based on a misapprehension of the function of FORPLAN.
At least at this stage of its development, FORPLAN is not an artificial life form.
It is, purely and simply, an analytic modeling tool. It provides, among other
things, an analysis of the economic consequences of various planning
assumptions. Plaintiffs complain that some of these assumptions included
grazing. However, examination of alternatives is precisely what is required of the
Forest Service.125

120

2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 96, at § 10F:37 (quoting Constance Brooks, Multiple Use Versus
Dominant Use: Can Federal Land Use Planning Fulfill the Principles of Multiple Use for Mineral
Development?, 33 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 1-1, 1-20 to 1-23 (1988)).
121
Land and Resource Management Planning, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,370, 58,370 (1996) (describing amendment
to Forest Service directives that “removed requirements that have become obsolete — such as mandating
the use of FORPLAN, now an outdated computer model”).
122
Griffin v. Yeutter, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20400 (S.D. Cal. 1990). On appeal, the 9th Circuit
held that the Forest Service violated neither its own NFMA regulations nor NEPA in relying on FORPLAN
during the planning process. The court labeled the attacks as challenges to the agency’s “choice of
methodology,” and concluded that reliance on FORPLAN did not preclude consideration of a reasonable
range of alternatives. Griffin v. Yeutter, 944 F.2d 908 (Table), 1991 WL 178134, at *3 (9th Cir. 1991).
123
Nevada Land Action Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1993).
124
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992).
125
Wilderness Soc’y v. Thomas, 188 F.3d 1130, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Ultimately, the court held that the Forest Service was “plainly entitled to identify
‘parameters and criteria” in generating alternatives for final consideration, and that the
agency did not violate the NFMA in using FORPLAN to assist its analysis.126
The Ninth Circuit was not the only inhospitable forum for attacks on the Forest
Service’s use of FORPLAN. In another case, an environmental group challenged a
LRMP by charging that the Forest Service relied on inappropriate assumptions regarding
the recreation values of timbering that provided input into the FORPLAN model. The
Forest Service’s overestimate of the benefits of timbering to recreation allegedly caused
the program to assume that timber harvesting was necessary for recreation. The district
court found nothing in the record to support the claim that the input was unreasonable
and rejected the challenge.127
An attack on the Forest Service’s use of the FORPLAN model to perform its
planning functions succeeded in one case, in which the court agreed with an
environmental group’s argument that the timber price assumptions that FORPLAN
incorporated were biased and obsolete. The agency violated its own regulations by using
ten-year old information instead of current inventory data based on the “best available
data.”128 Because the agency was unable to show that use of the erroneous data did not
appreciably affect planning results, the court rejected that portion of the plan,129 although
it rejected challenges to other aspects of FORPLAN’s application.130
The courts were therefore very deferential to the manner in which the Forest
Service used the FORPLAN model to assist in its NFMA planning functions. In the only
reported case in which a court accepted a FORPLAN-based attack, the court found that
the Forest Service violated its own regulations in providing input for the computer
analysis. Absent that kind of demonstrable mistake, litigants could not convince the
courts to closely scrutinize the analysis generated by FORPLAN or the manner in which
it affected the Forest Service’s planning decisions.
The few efforts by litigants to challenge Forest Service planning decisions based
on the use of other computer models in contexts other than those involving alleged
noncompliance with the NFMA’s diversity mandate tended to be similarly unsuccessful.
In one case, for example, a group of recreation outfitters criticized a travel zone model
126

Id. at 1136.
Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 500 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 105 F.3d
248 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom. Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
128
Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970, 993 (D. Colo. 1989) (quoting 36 C.F.R. §
219.12).
129
Id. Cf. Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 116 F.3d 1482 (Table), 1997 WL 295308 (7th Cir. 1997). In
that case, the court accepted a challenge to a LRMP based on the contention that the Forest Service used
outdated data in running a computer program known as HEP (Habitat Evaluation Program) that was
designed to predict how the plan would affect population levels of animal species. Although the court
found that the agency had adequately defended the use of the HEP computer program, it also concluded
that the agency did not respond sufficiently to the charge that the data fed into the program were flawed.
“As the plaintiffs point out, a computer program is only as reliable as its input; thus, they argue that if you
put garbage in, you get garbage out.” Id. at *13.
130
Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 991.
127
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that the Forest Service used to project travel patterns in a wilderness area. In rejecting
the attack, the court noted that the model “was developed over nearly two decades and
includes extensive studies based on travel diaries, as well as expert opinion and a
computer model. The Outfitter Plaintiffs’ challenge to these evaluation techniques is not
well taken. The law is clear that a court may not ‘second-guess methodological choices
made by an agency in its area of expertise.’”131
3.

Modeling to Protect Biological Diversity
a.

Modeling Choices

In seeking to protect wildlife from human activities, government and private
planners have used two different simulation approaches. The first is population viability
analysis (PVA), which involves the incorporation of information on habitat quality into
models used to predict wildlife population viability. The second seeks to simulate the
effects of various human activities (such as management actions approved by government
agencies) on the landscapes in which wildlife is found.132 PVA analysis is based on a
species census and an evaluation of the direct impact of the activities being contemplated
on population numbers. A habitat-based model uses habitat loss as a proxy for the impact
of the actions being considered on species viability.133 Both approaches rely on
assumptions about the manner in which humans and wildlife interact, and both produce
projections of future conditions that are of uncertain accuracy.134 The Forest Service has
employed both in its efforts to protect plant and animal diversity through the adoption of
land use plans and the implementation of site-specific management actions that are
consistent with those plans.
b.

The 1982 Planning Regulations

The Forest Service adopted its initial NFMA planning regulations in 1979, after
extensive consultation with the Committee of Scientists.135 Three years later, the Forest
Service amended the 1979 regulations136 “to streamline the land management planning
131

County of St. Louis v. Thomas, 967 F. Supp. 370, 375 (D. Minn. 1997) (quoting Inland Empire Pub.
Lands Council v. Schultz, 992 F.2d 977, 981 (9th Cir.1993)). Attacks on the use of Forest Service
computer models have also arisen in the context of the Forest Service’s alleged noncompliance with NEPA.
See, e.g., Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 57, at 502 (describing successful challenge to computer scoring
system used by the Forest Service to support its wilderness recommendations because the model failed to
supply the kind of site-specific analysis required by NEPA).
132
Michael A. Larson et al., Linking Population Viability, Habitat Suitability, and Landscape Simulation
Models for Conservation Planning, 180 ECOLOGICAL MODELING 103, 104 (2004). The authors assert that
“[m]ethods for habitat modeling based on landscape simulations and PVA modeling based on habitat
quality are well developed, but no published study of which we are aware has effectively joined them in a
single, comprehensive analysis.” Id. at 104.
133
Brennan, supra note 31, at 432.
134
Larson et al., supra note 132, at 114-15.
135
44 Fed. Reg. 53,928 (1979). The Secretary of Agriculture selected the Committee, which was
comprised of experts from outside the Forest Service, with the assistance of the National Academy of
Sciences. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 96, at 12 (listing the members of the Committee).
136
47 Fed. Reg. 43,026 (1982).
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process,”137 again after consulting with the Committee of Scientists. At the time the
Forest Service adopted the 1982 regulations, scientific understanding of biodiversity was
rudimentary. The prevailing view among scientists at the time apparently was that the
number of species in an area provides an accurate representation of the area’s
biodiversity.138 The 1982 planning regulations required the agency to assess the impact
of management actions on management indicator species because the Forest Service
believed that population changes in these MIS provided a gauge on the impacts of
management actions on other species as well.139
The 1982 planning regulations required that each land use plan include
monitoring and evaluation requirements that would provide a basis for a periodic
determination of the effects of management practices.140 The regulations also directed
planners to manage fish and wildlife habitat to maintain “viable populations” of existing
native and desired non-native vertebrate species. The regulations defined a “viable
population” for these purposes as “one which has the estimated numbers and distribution
of reproductive individuals to insure its continued existence is well distributed in the
planning area.”141 To insure the maintenance of viable populations, the regulations
required that land use plans provide sufficient habitat “to support, at least, a minimum
number of reproductive individuals” and that the habitat be well distributed to permit
those individuals to interact with others in the planning area.142
The 1982 regulations required that vertebrate and invertebrate species in the
planning area be “identified and selected as management indicator species” as a means of
estimating the effects of alternative management actions on fish and wildlife
populations.143 The plan documents also had to explain the reasons for selecting those
MIS. The regulations directed planning officials to select MIS “because their population
changes are believed to indicate the effects of management activities.”144 MIS were
supposed to include representatives, where appropriate, of plant and animal species listed
by federal or state agencies as endangered or threatened, species with special habitat
needs that might be significantly influenced by management programs, species
commonly hunted or fished, non-game species of special interest, and any additional
plant or animal species “selected because their population changes are believed to
indicate the effects of management activities on other species of selected major biological
137
138

47 Fed. Reg. 7678 (1982) (proposed rule).
See Corbin, supra note 108, at 392. Corbin adds that, more recently:
scientists [have] recognize[d] that biodiversity is far more than the simple sum total of species
found within an arbitrarily defined geographic locale. For instance, biodiversity is currently seen
within a hierarchical paradigm encompassing levels of biological organization from genes to
ecosystems. In addition, each level of the hierarchy comprises compositional, structural, and
functional elements.

Id.
139

Anna M. Seidman & Douglas S. Burdin, Forest Wildlife Management: A Legal Battleground for a
Scientific Dilemma, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 40, 41 (Fall 2005).
140
36 C.F.R. § 219.11(d) (2000).
141
36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2000).
142
Id.
143
36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1) (2000).
144
Id.
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communities or on water quality.”145 The regulations specified that, “[o]n the basis of
available scientific information,” planners were to “estimate the effects of changes in
vegetation type, timber age classes, community composition, rotation age, and year-long
suitability of habitat related to mobility of management indicator species. Where
appropriate, measures to mitigate adverse effects shall be prescribed.”146
Finally, the regulations parroted but amplified the NFMA’s diversity mandate.
They required that
forest planning provide for diversity of plant and animal communities and tree
species consistent with the overall multiple-use objectives of the planning area.
Such diversity shall be considered throughout the planning process. Inventories
shall include quantitative data making possible the evaluation of diversity in terms
of its prior and present condition.
For each planning alternative, the
interdisciplinary team shall consider how diversity will be affected by various
mixes of resource outputs and uses, including proposed management practices.147
The MIS approach to protecting biodiversity proceeds on the premise “that a
single species can act as a bellwether for environmental change. According to this
concept, the species is so closely tied to its environment that fluctuations in its population
directly reflect environmental changes that impact other species as well.”148 The
approach was attractive to those engaged in forest planning because it avoided the need to
engage in the much more burdensome task of monitoring and managing for all species
found in a particular ecosystem.149 It was a relatively sophisticated method of simulating
the effects of management actions on diversity in that it allowed modelers to consider a
variety of factors, including:
genetics, demographics, habitat needs, spatial distribution, inter-and intrapopulation dynamics, and environmental influences on the continued existence of
a population. With such a broad scope of relevant factors, PVA is capable of
incorporating many levels of the biodiversity hierarchy. Even more powerful is
its ability to link those factors to population extinction probabilities. Once the
critical factors in a population's survival are hypothesized, land managers can
estimate how many reproductive individuals are necessary to maintain a healthy
population over a chosen period of time.150
145

Id.
Id.
147
36 C.F.R. § 219.26 (2000).
148
Corbin, supra note 108, at 397.
149
As one commentator has noted:
The advantages are obvious. In an age of budgetary and personnel constraints, land management
agencies like the Forest Service can not afford outlays of resources necessary to individually
manage each species in an ecosystem. The ability to meet a seemingly impossible obligation to
maintain viable populations of all wildlife by simply monitoring a handful of species is to move
from the impossible to the probable.
Id.
150
Id. at 396.
146
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It soon became apparent, however, that the MIS approach to protecting
biodiversity was not a panacea. Even though it is less resource-intensive than an
approach based upon monitoring of all species within an ecosystem, it nevertheless
requires the accumulation of large amounts of information, and sometimes that
information is difficult to obtain. In addition, the extrapolation from the impacts of
management actions on one or a selected small group of species to the effects of those
actions on an entire ecosystem upon which the entire approach depends is fraught with
uncertainty. This is particularly likely to be true if little is understood about the natural
fluctuations of the MIS.151
These difficulties prompted the Forest Service to consider using the habitat-based
rather than the population viability approach. Under this second approach, planners do
not seek to keep track of the population numbers of the designated MIS. Instead, they
assess the effects of management actions on the habitat of the MIS, based on the
assumption that “the presence of adequate healthy habitat for a species would indicate the
presence of viable populations of those species.”152 This “proxy-on-proxy” approach has
been described as follows:
For this approach, the Forest Service designates the first proxy level by selecting
several MISs that the Service believes will represent the needs of various types of
wildlife that live throughout the forest and share the same habitat needs as the
designated MISs. Each MIS acts as an indicator, or proxy, for many other
species. The Forest Service does not inventory or monitor the population of each
MIS, but instead designates certain types and quantities of habitat that it deems
sufficient to maintain viable populations of the selected MISs. The Service then
assesses the impact of a proposed management activity on the habitats and,
consequently, on the populations of the MISs and the species that the MISs
represent.153
The benefit of the proxy-on-proxy simulation approach is that it avoids the need
to do any population monitoring whatsoever. The agency can fulfill its responsibility to
protect biodiversity through the planning process simply by assuming that if sufficient
habitat acreage for the MIS (as defined by the agency’s scientists) remains following a
particular management action such as a timber harvest, then a viable population of the
MIS must necessarily also exist. Because the MIS is a surrogate for the other species
present in the area affected, a viable population of MIS necessarily translates into plant
151

Id. at 397-98. Corbin asserts that:
It is simply naive, in an ecological sense, to assume that effects on one species will mirror those
on all other species within an ecosystem. . . . Choosing an appropriate indicator species requires a
detailed understanding of the species selected, how it reacts to changes in its habitat, and how the
larger community reflects those changes. For most of the nation’s forest system, the detailed data
required to select indicator species did not exist when NFMA was passed, and likely does not exist
in an appreciably greater amount today.

Id.
152
153

Seidman & Burdin, supra note 139, at 41.
Id.
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and animal diversity sufficient to satisfy the NFMA planning provisions.154 It may not
even be necessary for the habitat to exist in any particular location or condition.155
The courts have taken divergent approaches when faced with the question of
whether the proxy-on-proxy simulation approach is consistent with the Forest Service’s
responsibility to provide for diversity of plant and animal communities.156 The Ninth
Circuit first addressed the validity of that approach in the Inland Empire Public Lands
Council case.157 The issue was whether the Forest Service complied with its regulations
implementing the diversity requirement, and in particular, with the regulatory provision
that dictated that fish and wildlife habitat be managed to maintain viable populations of
vertebrate populations.158 The environmental group plaintiffs contended that the agency
violated the statutory diversity requirement and the viability regulation by failing to
examine the population dynamics of MIS in old-growth forests in which timber harvests
were scheduled. The Forest Service responded that its habitat viability analyses
sufficed.159 The court approved the agency’s conclusion that a species would remain
viable as long as the percentage of each type of habitat (such as nesting, feeding, or
denning) remaining after the timber sales would be greater than required for the species
to survive. According to the court, that assumption was “eminently reasonable”160 and
the Forest Service’s analysis was sound because it used all of the scientific data then
available.161
In subsequent cases, the Ninth Circuit has held that the Forest Service’s approval
of timber sales violated the 1982 regulations implementing the NFMA’s diversity
requirement because, even though the proxy-on-proxy approach is valid as a general
proposition, the agency relied on habitat monitoring methodologies that were arbitrary
and capricious.162 The court summarized its precedents concerning the legality of the
154

The burdens on the agency of pursuing the proxy-on-proxy approach are particularly light if the agency
has already collected habitat data in making timber inventories. See Corbin, supra note 108, at 401.
155
Thus, Corbin asserts, “[d]isturbance, such as logging, is not precluded because its impact on the species
will never be detected.” Id.
156
The courts also have addressed the validity of the Forest Service’s use of models or surrogates in
connection with other NFMA requirements concerning habitat for MIS. See, e.g., Western Watersheds
Project v. United States Forest Serv., 62 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1142 (D. Idaho 2006) (holding that the
Forest Service acted improperly by using a model for estimating the effects of grazing in seeking to comply
with NFMA regulation requiring that forest plans determine “the suitability and potential capability of
[NFS] lands for producing forage for grazing animals and for providing habitat for [MIS]”).
157
Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. United States Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996).
158
36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1998).
159
Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council, 88 F.3d at 759.
160
Id. at 761.
161
Id. at 762.
162
Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
Forest Service improperly relied on habitat analyses in lieu of population monitoring where there was no
evidence that it consulted current or accurate field studies and failed to identify the methodology it used in
determining what constitutes suitable habitat); Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957,
972-73 (9th Cir. 2002). See also Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. United States Forest Serv., 2007 WL 1417163,
No. 05-17093 (9th Cir. May 9, 2007) (invalidating proxy-on-proxy analysis because the Forest Service
neither analyzed acreage needed by MIS nor analyzed how much suitable acreage would remain in the
project area after the project was completed); Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1063-65 (9th Cir.
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Forest Service’s reliance on the proxy-on-proxy approach as follows: the agency could
satisfy the diversity requirement by assessing the impact of particular management
actions such as timber harvests on habitat “only where both the Forest Service’s
knowledge of what quality and quantity of habitat is necessary to support the species and
the Forest Service’s method for measuring the existing amount of that habitat are
reasonably reliable and accurate.”163
Other courts refused to allow the Forest Service to rely on the proxy-on-proxy
approach at all. In Sierra Club v. Martin, for example, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that habitat analysis did not comply with the requirement of the 1982 regulations that the
Forest Service monitor population trends of MIS and their relationships to habitat
changes.164 The court held that the agency’s approval of timber sales was arbitrary and
capricious because it failed to gather quantitative data on MIS and use that data to
measure the impact of habitat changes on the forest’s diversity.165 Other courts agreed

2005) (holding that the Forest Service violated the diversity mandate by assuming that commercial thinning
and prescribed burning activities in old-growth forests would be beneficial to old-growth dependent species
on the basis of an unverified hypothesis).
163
Native Ecosystems Council v. United States Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1250 (9th Cir. 2005). See also
Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. United States Forest Serv., 2007 WL 1417163, at *10, No. 05-17093 (9th Cir. May
9, 2007) (stating that ‘we have previously endorsed the practice [of using habitat as a proxy for population]
absent some indication in the record that USFS’s underlying methodology is flawed”); Cascadia Wildlands
Project v. United States Forest Serv., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1163 (D. Or. 2005) (stating that “if the
methodology used for evaluating the effect of a plan on MIS populations is reasonably accurate, there is no
absolute requirement that the Forest Service conduct population counts of MIS when analyzing
management alternatives”); League of Wilderness Defenders—Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project v.
Bosworth, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1303 (D. Or. 2005) (stating that, “[i]n the Ninth Circuit, . . . habitat
analysis as a proxy for monitoring population trends is sufficient under the 1982 regulations where the
methodology utilized by the Forest Service is sound”). In a case involving alleged noncompliance with the
monitoring requirements of a NFMA forest plan, the court stated that the reliability of habitat capability
models “may be jeopardized in either of two ways: If either ‘monitoring were not taking place, or if the
on-going monitoring reveals that the [habitat capability model] is not meeting expectations,’ then the Forest
Service cannot rely on the surrogate methodology of the model.” Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Blackwell, 389
F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1213 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. United States Fish and
Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004)). The court in Gifford Pinchot held that the Forest
Service may use changes in habitat to assess whether an agency’s actions would violate the prohibition on
jeopardizing species listed under the ESA if it “’reasonably ensures’” that the proxy results mirror reality.”
Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 97273 (9th Cir. 2002)).
164
Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1, 7 & n.10 (11th Cir. 1999) The 1982 regulations provided that
“[p]opulation trends of the [MIS] will be monitored and relationships to habitat changes will be
determined. Id. at 5 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 219.19).
165
Id. at 7. The Forest Service lacked population data for half of the MIS in the forest in which the sales
had been proposed. A federal district court later interpreted Martin as allowing the Forest Service to rely
on estimating procedures such as sampling or surveys to satisfy MIS data collection requirements. In
particular, it concluded that the Forest Service may rely on sampling data for fish MIS, numerical survey
data for vertebrate MIS, and descriptive reports for plant MIS. Forest Conservation Council v. Jacobs, 374
F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1203-04 (N.D. Ga. 2005), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Ouachita Watch League v.
Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2006).
U:\Word\articles\NFMA data gaps ssrn.doc
glicksman

Page 32

7/13/2007

To be published at 83 Indiana L.J., Issue # 2
with the Eleventh Circuit that the 1982 regulations did not permit the Forest Service to
substitute habitat information for actual, quantitative population data.166
c.

The 2000 Planning Regulations

The Forest Service adopted the first substantial revisions to the 1982 planning
rules in November 2000, just three months before the end of the Clinton
Administration.167 Those regulations never went into effect, however. Acting at least in
part in response to concerns over the 2000 regulations expressed by the Society of
American Foresters,168 the Department of Agriculture first extended by one year the
effective date of the 2000 regulations169 and then delayed compliance until the
promulgation of a new final planning rule.170
The 2000 regulations required that each LRMP “contain a practicable, effective,
and efficient monitoring strategy to evaluate sustainability in the plan area” and that the
strategy “require monitoring of appropriate plan decisions and characteristics of
sustainability.”171 In particular, the regulations required monitoring of both ecosystem
and species diversity. With respect to the former, the regulations required evaluation of
“the status and trend of selected physical and biological characteristics of ecosystem
diversity” and documentation of “the reasons for selection of characteristics to be
166

E.g., Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 372 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir. 2004). See also Utah Envtl.
Cong. v. Bosworth, 439 F.3d 1184, 1191 (10th Cir. 2006); Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Zieroth, 190 F. Supp. 2d
1265, 1271-72 (Utah 2002) (holding that Forest Service regulations require collection of quantitative data
on populations to measure the impact of habitat changes on forest diversity and that habitat data may not be
used as a proxy); Forest Guardians v. United States Forest Serv., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1281 (D.N.M.
2001) (holding that the Forest Service’s regulations require that it collect population data, not just habitat
trend data, for MIS).
The 10th Circuit also held, however, that the agency need not develop forest-wide data if it can
determine the viability of the MIS at issue without a forest-wide survey but that it must engage in good
faith efforts to confirm the presence or absence of MIS. Utah Envtl. Cong., 372 F.3d at 1230. In an earlier
case, the 10th Circuit held that the diversity regulations did not require the Forest Service to collect
population data or make data-based population viability assessments in the absence of any evidence that
MIS existed in the affected area. Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir.
1999). Cf. Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Troyer, 479 F.3d 1269, 1286 (10th Cir. 2007) (confirming that although the
1982 regulations required quantitative population data, “we otherwise imposed no specific requirements on
the type of data that must be collected,” and upholding the Forest Service’s conclusion that the available
population data were scientifically useful).
167
National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,514 (Nov. 9, 2000).
168
The Society for American Foresters is “the national scientific and educational organization representing
the forestry profession in the United States.” Society of American Foresters, Mission Statement, available
at http:/www.safnet.org/who/whoweare.cfm.
169
National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Extension of Deadline Compliance;
Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,552 (May 17, 2001) (asserting that the agency was not prepared to fully
implement the rule nationwide).
170
National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Extension of Deadline Compliance;
Interim Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,341 (May 20, 2002). For discussion of the Bush Administration’s
delays in implementing the 2000 planning regulations, see Alyson Flournoy et al., In Name Only: How the
Bush Administration's National Forest Planning Rule Frees the Forest Service from Mandatory Standards
and Public Accountability, Center for Progressive Reform White Paper 508 (June 2005), at 5-6, available
at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/Forests_508.pdf.
171
36 C.F.R. § 219.11 (2001).
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monitored, monitoring objectives, methodology, and designate critical values that will
prompt reviews of plan decisions.”172 Monitoring of species diversity had to evaluate
“focal species”173 and selected “species-at-risk.”174
The 2000 regulations required monitoring of ecological conditions, but did not
generally require population monitoring. The regulations, however, specified that a
particular plan’s monitoring strategy “may require population monitoring for some focal
species and some species-at-risk,” which could be accomplished by methods such as
population occurrence and presence/absence data, sampling population characteristics,
using population indices to track relative population trends, or inferring population status
from ecological conditions.175 Planning officials were to decide whether to monitor
populations, and if so to select the methods for doing so, based on factors that included
the degree of risk to the species, the degree to which particular species characteristics
lend themselves to monitoring, the reasons for listing a species as a focal species or
species-at-risk, and the strength of association between ecological conditions and
population dynamics. The regulations stated that population trend monitoring “is often
appropriate in those cases where risk to species viability is high and population
characteristics cannot be reliably inferred from ecological conditions.”176 Any document
authorizing site-specific action also had to describe required monitoring and
evaluation.177 Monitoring methods could be changed to reflect new information without
the need to amend or revise the applicable LRMP.178
The regulations designated the first priority for NFMA planning and management
to be the maintenance or restoration of ecological sustainability of the national forests.179
The Forest Service regarded both ecosystem and species diversity as components of
Ecosystem diversity included several characteristics,
ecological sustainability.180
172

36 C.F.R. § 219.11(a)(1)(i) (2001).
The regulations defined focal species as follows:
Focal species are surrogate measures used in the evaluation of ecological sustainability, including
species and ecosystem diversity. The key characteristic of a focal species is that its status and
trend provide insights to the integrity of the larger ecological system to which it belongs.
Individual species, or groups of species that use habitat in similar ways or which perform similar
ecological functions, may be identified as focal species. Focal species serve an umbrella function
in terms of encompassing habitats needed for many other species, play a key role in maintaining
community structure or processes, are sensitive to the changes likely to occur in the area, or
otherwise serve as an indicator of ecological sustainability. Certain focal species may be used as
surrogates to represent ecological conditions that provide for viability of some other species,
rather than directly representing the population dynamics of those other species.
36 C.F.R. § 219.36 (2001) (emphasis added).
174
Species at risk were defined as “[f]ederally listed endangered, threatened, candidate, and proposed
species and other species for which loss of viability, including reduction in distribution or abundance, is a
concern within the plan area. Other species-at-risk may include sensitive species and state listed species.
A species-at-risk also may be selected as a focal species.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.36 (2001).
175
36 C.F.R. § 219.11(a)(1)(ii)(B) (2001).
176
36 C.F.R. § 219.11(a)(1)(ii)(C) (2001).
177
36 C.F.R. § 219.11(b) (2001).
178
36 C.F.R. § 219.11(c) (2001).
179
36 C.F.R. § 219.2 (2001).
180
36 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(1) (2001).
173
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including major vegetation types, water resources, soil resources, air resources, and focal
species that provide “insights to the larger ecological systems with which they are
associated.”181 Species diversity was defined in terms of species characteristics that
included “the number, distribution, and geographic ranges of plant and animal species,
including focal species and species-at-risk that serve as surrogate measures of species
diversity. Species-at-risk and focal species must be identified for the plan area.”182
Planners had to evaluate ecological sustainability by describing the current status
of both ecosystem and species diversity, risks to ecological sustainability, the cumulative
effects of human and natural disturbances, and the contributions of NFS lands to the
ecological sustainability of all lands within the area being analyzed.183 The evaluation of
ecosystem diversity had to include “[i]nformation about focal species that provide
insights to the integrity of the larger ecological system to which they belong.”184 The
evaluation of species diversity had to include, “as appropriate,” assessments of the risks
to species viability and the identification of ecological conditions needed to maintain
species viability over time. Individual species assessments for the viability of any
endangered, threatened, or candidate species under the ESA were mandatory, while for
all other species, the regulations authorized a variety of evaluative approaches, including
“individual species assessments and assessments of focal species or other indicators used
as surrogates in the evaluation of ecological conditions needed to maintain species
viability.”185
The regulations required that plan decisions that would affect ecological
sustainability be based on the evaluations of ecosystem and species diversity. Plan
decisions affecting ecosystem diversity had to provide for maintenance or restoration of
the characteristics of ecosystem composition and structure within the range of variability
expected under natural disturbance regimes. Where definition of the range of variability
was impractical, plan decisions had to “provide for measurable progress toward
maintaining or restoring ecosystem diversity,” based on independently peer-reviewed
scientific methods other than the expected range of variability to maintain or restore
ecosystem diversity.186 Plan decisions affecting species diversity had to “provide for
ecological conditions that the responsible official determines provide a high likelihood
that those conditions are capable of supporting over time the viability of native and
desired non-native species well distributed throughout their ranges within the plan
area.”187

181

36 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(1)(i) (2001).
36 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(1)(ii) (2001) (emphasis added).
183
36 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(2) (2001).
184
36 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(2)(i)(A) (2001). The agency also had to describe the effects of human activity on
ecosystem diversity. Id. § 219.20(a)(2)(i)(E).
185
36 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(2)(ii) (2001) (emphasis added). The regulations provided that, with the
exception of species listed under the ESA, assessments of functional, taxonomic, or habitat groups rather
than individual species “may be appropriate” for species groups that contain many species. Id.
186
36 C.F.R. § 219.20(b)(1) (2001).
187
36 C.F.R. § 219.20(b)(2)(i) (2001).
182
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The planning regulations issued during the Clinton Administration thus set as the
first priority of the NFMA planning process the maintenance or restoration of ecological
sustainability. The regulations appeared to treat ecosystem and species diversity as
equally important components of ecological sustainability. Planning officials had to
conduct evaluations of both kinds of diversity, and plan decisions had to protect both
kinds of diversity. Every LRMP had to include a monitoring strategy to evaluate
sustainability in the plan area. The 2000 regulations replaced the concept of the MIS
with two new surrogate measures of both components of ecological sustainability, focal
species and species-at-risk. Both focal species and species at risk had to be evaluated as
part of the process of monitoring species diversity. In addition, the regulations included
focal species as one of the characteristics of ecosystem diversity because such species
provide insights into the condition of the larger ecosystem of which they are a part.
The regulations did not mandate population monitoring of affected species in all
cases. They recognized, however, that population monitoring might be necessary for
focal species and species-at-risk through any of several illustrative methodologies, based
on factors such as the degree of risk being experienced by the species, the degree to
which the species lend themselves to population monitoring, and the strength of the
association between ecological conditions and population dynamics. The regulations
declared population monitoring to be particularly appropriate in situations marked by
high risk to species viability and inability to infer reliable population characteristics from
ecological conditions. In short, the 2000 regulations continued to rely heavily on the
effects of management actions on designated species as surrogates for the ability to
maintain plant and animal diversity in the national forests.
d.

The 2005 Planning Regulations

Based on its conclusion that the 2000 planning regulations were difficult to
implement and failed to clarify the “programmatic nature” of land and resource
management planning,188 the Forest Service completely scrapped the 2000 regulations
and replaced them with a new set of regulations in 2005.189 The Forest Service, which
adopted the new regulations without convening a Committee of Scientists,190
characterized the 2005 regulations as “a paradigm shift in land management planning.”191
For one thing, although the 2005 regulations nominally retain sustainability as the overall
goal of the NFMA planning process,192 the regulations deemphasize the ecological
component of sustainability by declaring sustainability to be composed of three
“interrelated and interdependent” components: social, economic, and ecological
188

National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 72,770,
72,770-71 (Dec. 6, 2002).
189
National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023 (Jan.
5, 2005).
190
See Flournoy et al., supra note 170, at 7.
191
70 Fed. Reg. at 1024. Representative Tom Udall of New Mexico called the 2005 regulations “a radical
overhaul of forest policy.” Flournoy et al., supra note 170, at 7 (quoting Juliet Eilperin, New Rules Issued
for National Forests; Some Environmental Protections Eased, THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 24, 2004, at
A1).
192
36 C.F.R. § 219.10 (2006).
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sustainability.193 Included among the changes in approach reflected in the 2005
regulations was a shift away from assessment of species diversity to assessment of
ecosystem diversity as a means of implementing the NFMA’s diversity requirement. In
particular, the 2005 regulations abandoned the approaches reflected in both the 1982 and
2000 regulations for monitoring the effect of management actions on species selected on
the basis of their capacity to serve as surrogates for the diversity of plant and animal
species in the affected planning area as a whole.
The 2005 regulations state that the overall goal of the ecological element of
sustainability is “to provide a framework to contribute to sustaining native ecological
systems by providing ecological conditions to support diversity of native plant and
animal species in the plan area.”194 Achieving this goal “will satisfy the statutory
requirement to provide for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the
suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to meet overall multiple-use
objectives.”195 Unlike the 2000 regulations, the 2005 regulations declare ecosystem
diversity to be the “primary means by which a plan contributes to sustaining ecological
systems” and LRMPs therefore “must establish a framework to provide the
characteristics of ecosystem diversity in the plan area.”196 The plan must include
additional measures to protect species diversity only if planning officials determine that
the plan provisions designed to protect ecosystem diversity are insufficient to provide
appropriate ecological conditions for specific endangered or threatened species, speciesof-concern, or species-of-interest.197 It is within that broad framework that the 2005
193

70 Fed. Reg. at 1028. See also 36 C.F.R. § 219.10 (2006) (stating that “sustainability, for any unit of the
National Forest System, has three interrelated and interdependent elements: social, economic, and
ecological,” and that a LRMP “can contribute to sustainability by creating a framework to guide on-theground management of projects and activities,” but cannot itself ensure sustainability). For discussion of
the shift in emphasis away from ecological sustainability, see Flournoy et al., supra note 170, at 9-11;
Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling in Opposite Directions: Roadless Area Management Under the Clinton
and Bush Administrations, 34 ENVTL. L. 1143, 1172-76, 1204-07 (2004).
194
36 C.F.R. § 219.10(a) (2006).
195
36 C.F.R. § 219.10(a) (2006).
196
36 C.F.R. § 219.10(a)(1) (2006). The Forest Service now defines ecosystem diversity as “the variety
and relative extent of ecosystem types including their composition, structure, and processes.” Forest
Service Handbook (FSH) 1909.12, § 43.1. Agency officials are to evaluate ecosystem diversity by
identifying selected ecosystem characteristics, assessing their natural variation under historic disturbance
regimes, and comparing that to existing and projected future conditions. Id. § 43.1.1. Compare the
following definition of ecosystem diversity:
The concept of “ecosystem diversity” refers to the variety of biological communities and their
physical settings and can be used to associate species with their required habitat. This association
between habitat and ecosystem diversity is possible because a species' habitat is selected from the
ecosystems available to that species (i.e., habitat is a subset of ecosystems for a specific species).
Seidman & Burdin, supra note 139, at 42.
197
36 C.F.R. § 219.10(a)(2) (2006). "Species-of-concern" are those species for which their continued
existence is a concern and listing under the ESA may occur. Id. § 219.16. "Species-of-interest" are species
for which the responsible planning official determines that management actions may be necessary or
desirable to achieve ecological or other multiple use objectives. Id. The Forest Service directives will
describe “a systematic, scientifically credible, and efficient approach, using existing information, to
identify species-of-concern and species-of-interest.” 70 Fed. Reg. at 1048. See also FSH 1909.12, §§
43.22b-43.2c (defining species-of-concern as “species for which the Responsible Official determines
management actions may be necessary to prevent listing under [ESA]” and species-of-interest as “species
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regulations address the responsibility of planning officials to rely on the “best available
science” and to take steps to protect the diversity of plant and animal species.
(1)

The Use of the Best Available Science

The 2005 NFMA planning regulations state that agency planning officials “must
take into account the best available science.”198 The agency’s position is that it is
impossible to provide a substantive definition of the “best available science”199 in a
regulation or directive.200 As a result, the agency’s approach to describing its
responsibility to take the best available science into account is process-based. The 2005
regulations, amplified by agency directives,201 describe a four-step discovery process
that, when followed, is supposed to insure that planners satisfy the requirement that the
best available science be taken into account and that it will properly influence plan
components.202 For purposes of the planning regulations, “taking into account the best
available science” requires planning officials to (1) document how the best available
science was taken into account in the planning process, (2-3) evaluate and disclose
substantial scientific uncertainties and substantial risks associated with plan components
based on that science, and (4) document that the agency appropriately interpreted and
applied the science.203 This process of evaluation and disclosure of uncertainty and risk
for which the Responsible Official determines that management actions may be necessary or desirable to
achieve ecological or other multiple-use objectives”).
198
36 C.F.R. § 219.11(a) (2006).
199
The agency has taken a stab at defining the term science, however. According to the Forest Service
Manual (FSM),
[s]cience refers to knowledge, information, concepts, methods, and theories based on organized
systems of facts learned from study, observation, and experience. Science is brought into the
planning process through evaluations, other information gathering, and syntheses. The application
of science in planning provides the Responsible Official with knowledge, methods, and expert
review in order to inform the planning process.
FSM 1921.8.
200
Cf. The Ecology Ctr. v. United States Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183, 1194 n.4 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that
“we have not found, nor have the parties cited, any cases that define ‘best available science’ in today’s
context”).
201
“The Forest Service directives consist of the Forest Service Manual (FSM) and the Forest Service
Handbook (FSH), which contain the agency’s policies, practices, and procedures and serve as the primary
basis for the internal management and control of programs and administrative direction to Forest Service
employees. The directives for all agency programs are set out on the World Wide Web/Internet at
http://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives.” National Forest System Land Management Planning Directives;
Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 5124, 5124 (Jan. 31, 2006).
202
71 Fed. Reg. at 5130.
203
36 C.F.R. § 219.11(a) (2006). The FSM provides a slightly different description of the four-step
process:
The Responsible Official shall demonstrate that the best available science (36 CFR 219.11) is
taken into account during the planning process by using appropriate procedures including: 1.
Timely and comprehensive gathering of peer-reviewed and other quality-controlled literature,
studies, or reports related to the planning issues. 2. Assessing the information for pertinence
based on objectivity, utility, relevance, and integrity. 3. Synthesizing the pertinent information
for application in the planning process. 4. Based on assumptions and professional judgment,
applying the best available science synthesis to the planning process, including developing plan
components and evaluating plan outcomes.
FSM 1921.81.
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is designed to “provide a crosscheck for appropriate interpretation of science and help[ ]
clarify the limitations of the information base for the plan.”204 Planners may meet these
requirements by using independent peer review, a science advisory board, or “other
review methods to evaluate the consideration of science in the planning process.”205
According to the Forest Service, this four-step process “represents the state-of-the art for
science review for natural resource management.”206
Agency planning officials must conduct substantive reviews of the best available
science applied during the planning process. The review process must include, at a
minimum, an assessment of the scientific credibility of (1) the methods selected and
applied to evaluate a plan’s components; (2) information gathered and applied for these
evaluations; and (3) synthesis, interpretation, and inferences drawn from these
evaluations.207 These review procedures are described more fully in the Forest Service
Handbook (FSH). The purpose of the reviews, according to the FSH, “is to enhance and
maximize the quality and credibility of plans and planning evaluations” and “review how
the best available science was taken into account, not to add to the body of scientific
knowledge.”208 A science review, as described in the FSH, should address four main
questions:
1. Has applicable and available scientific information been considered? 2. Has
scientific information been interpreted reasonably and accurately? 3. Are the
uncertainties associated with the scientific information acknowledged and
documented? 4. Have the relevant trends of social, economic, and ecological
resources . . . , including risks and uncertainties, been identified and
documented?209
The Forest Service has explained in the Forest Service Manual (FSM)210 that the
“best available science” may be uncertain due to evolving understandings of social,
economic, and ecological processes and conditions. The sources of uncertainty identified
by the agency include incomplete or conflicting scientific information; assumptions,
interpretation, and extrapolation of information; and predictions of future trends or
conditions. The Manual concedes that some level of uncertainty will continue to exist
even if planning officials comply with their responsibility to take into account the best
available science. It accordingly requires that they evaluate substantial uncertainty in the
204

70 Fed. Reg. at 1027.
36 C.F.R. § 219.11(b) (2006).
206
71 Fed. Reg. at 5130.
207
FSM 1921.85.
208
FSH 1909.12, § 41.1 (also stating that “[s]cience reviews allow [planners] to document that the best
available science was taken into account in the planning process” and that “[r]eviews should be conducted
in a timely and expeditious manner to provide useful feedback”).
209
FSH 1909.12, § 41.1.
210
The Forest Service has described the FSM, which form part of the agency’s “directives,” as a document
that “contains legal authorities, objectives, policies, responsibilities, instructions, and guidance needed on a
continuing basis by Forest Service line officers and primary staff to plan and execute programs and
activities, while the FSH is generally the principal source of specialized guidance and instruction for
carrying out the policies, objectives, and responsibilities contained in the FSM.” National Forest System
Land Management Planning Directives; Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 5124, 5124 (Jan. 31, 2006).
205
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best available science by identifying its sources and assessing how it affects the planning
process.211
The “best available science mandate” of the 2005 planning regulations is a
watered-down version of the proposed planning rules issued by the Forest Service in
2002. Those rules would have required that agency planning decisions “be consistent
with” the best available science, rather than that planners merely “take into account” the
best available science. The Forest Service stated in the preamble to the final regulations
that, despite the change in language, “[t]he actual process for taking into account science
in planning has not changed from the 2002 proposed rule.”212 The agency added,
however, that science is “only one aspect of decisionmaking” (albeit a “significant source
of information”) and that public input, competing use demands, budget projections,213
and “many other factors” are also relevant to planning decisions.214
This open-ended recitation of potentially relevant factors provides ample room for
political factors to override science as the basis for planning decisions without an
acknowledgment by the agency of the actual basis for its decision. At a minimum, the
failure to specify what these “other factors” might be, and how they are supposed to be
weighted in comparison to science and other factors in the decisionmaking process, is
likely to hinder the transparency of the planning process and make it more difficult for
interested persons to provide meaningful input. The agency’s decision to shift much of
the detailed description of the planning process requirements from regulations published
in the Code of Federal Regulations to the lesser known agency “directives” (which
include the Forest Service Manual and the Forest Service Handbook) may exacerbate
these difficulties.215

211

FSM 1921.82. See also id. 1921.84 (requiring that planning officials disclose “evaluations of substantial
uncertainty and risk in the plan set of documents” and that the disclosure of uncertainty “include the
evidence for and controversy regarding key assumptions that influence planning outcomes.”).
212
70 Fed. Reg. at 1027. The agency also asserted that the 2005 regulations “retain[ ] the emphasis in the
2002 proposed rule on the consideration of science in planning, on documenting how science was
interpreted and applied, and on evaluating the associated risks and uncertainties of using that science.” Id.
at 1048.
213
According to the FSM, “[c]ost should be considered in the decision of how to apply the best available
science in the planning effort.” FSM 1921.81.
214
70 Fed. Reg. at 1027. See also id. at 1048 (explaining that “[t]he words ‘consistent with’ ha[ve] been
replaced by ‘take into account’ because this term better expresses that formal science is just one source of
information for the Responsible Official and only one aspect of decisionmaking” ).
215
The Forest Service stated in the preamble to the 2005 regulations that:
The final rule does not include many of the specific analytical processes and requirements set out
in the 2002 proposed rule. Appropriate processes will be included in the Forest Service directives.
The Department believes it is more appropriate to put specific procedural analytical requirements
in the Forest Service directives rather than in the rule itself so that the analytical procedures can be
changed more rapidly if new and better techniques emerge. As for other portions of the Forest
Service directives, public notice and comment is required where there is substantial public interest
or controversy.
70 Fed. Reg. at 1028. The agency also defended this shift on the ground that the “directives can be more
extensive and can be more easily changed as the agency learns how to improve its analytic processes and as
new scientific concepts and new technological capabilities become available.” Id. at 1029.
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(2)

Protection of Diversity

One of the most fundamental alterations that the 2005 NFMA planning
regulations make in the approaches reflected in the 1982 and 2000 regulations relates to
the manner in which they require the Forest Service to monitor, assess,216 and protect
biodiversity. The Forest Service explained in the preamble to the 2005 regulations that,
thirty years after the adoption of the NFMA, the concepts of biological diversity at
different spatial and temporal scales (including genetic, species, structural, and functional
diversity) have been substantially refined. The complexity of the concept of biological
diversity, according to the agency, requires “a corresponding complicated array of
concepts, measures, and values from several scientific disciplines.”217 The Forest Service
settled as its foundational principle that “maintenance of the diversity of plant and animal
communities starts with an ecosystem approach,” which seeks to “provide a framework
for maintaining and restoring ecosystem conditions necessary to conserve most
species.”218 The more effective a plan is in protecting ecosystem diversity, “the less need
there is for species-specific analysis.”219 Accordingly, it is only when Forest Service
planners determine that the ecosystem approach fails to provide an adequate framework
for maintaining and restoring conditions to support species listed under the ESA, speciesof-concern, and species-of-interest that the plan must include additional provisions for
those species.220 LRMPs should provide “measures for accounting for progress toward
ecosystem and species diversity goals. . . . Progress toward desired conditions and
objectives will be monitored and the results made available to the public. The adaptive
monitoring and feedback process will help maintain and improve diversity.”221
216

“In the most general sense, ecological risk assessment involves estimating the likelihood that an
identified hazard will have a negative effect, and estimating the ecological consequences of that negative
effect.” GARY K. MEFFE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 376 (2d ed. 1997).
217
70 Fed. Reg. at 1028.
218
Id. See also id. at 1047-48 (stating that the “ecosystem diversity framework provides an essential
ecological context and identifies the unique contributions that lands can make to the three elements of
sustainability”).
219
Id. at 1048.
220
Id. at 1028. See also 71 Fed. Reg. at 5137 (stating that the 2005 planning rule “stipulates that the
species diversity approach is to be used when the components set up through ecosystem diversity need to
be supplemented to provide appropriate ecological conditions for listed species, species-of-concern, and
species-of-interest”); FSH 1909.12, § 43.25 (stating that “[a]s a rule, provisions in plan components for
conservation of species should focus first on providing appropriate amounts and distribution of suitable
habitat throughout the plan area over time,” and that “[o]nly where a broad-scale ecosystem diversity
framework will not provide appropriate ecological conditions for listed species, species-of-concern, and
species-of-interest, should small spatial scales be considered or analyzed”). The Forest Service
characterized its approach as “a complementary ecosystem and species diversity approach for ecological
sustainability.” 70 Fed. Reg. at 1029.
A 2006 report issued by the H. John Heinz Center for Science, Economics and the Environment
identified ten key information gaps that prevent effective reporting on key indicators of the condition and
use of U.S. ecosystems. The ten data gaps related to both species and ecosystem health. See THE H. JOHN
HEINZ CENTER FOR SCIENCE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, FILLING THE GAPS: PRIORITY DATA
NEEDS AND KEY MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES FOR NATIONAL REPORTING ON ECOSYSTEM CONDITION 21
(May 2006), available at http://www.heinzctr.org/publications.shtml.
221
70 Fed. Reg. at 1028. See also Seidman & Burdin, supra note 139, at 43 (stating that the 2005
regulations “recognize that the planning process should include monitoring of progress toward ecosystem
and species diversity”).
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In marked contrast to the 1982 regulations222 and the 2002 proposed
regulations,223 the 2005 planning regulations do not require that the Forest Service
provide for viable populations of plant and animal species. The Forest Service provided
three principal explanations for this omission. First, the agency concluded based on
experience “that ensuring species viability is not always possible” due to problems such
as species-specific distribution problems, declines in species due to factors beyond the
agency’s control, or the inability of available land to support species.224 Second, NFS
units contain “very large” numbers of recognized species, and the Forest Service found it
“clearly impractical” to analyze all those species. Further, previous attempts to analyze
the full suite of species via groups, surrogates, and representatives have had mixed
success in practice.”225 Third, the agency’s past focus on the viability requirement
diverted attention and resources away from an ecosystem-based approach to land
management, which the Forest Service now considers to be “the most efficient and
effective way to manage for the broadest range of species with the limited resources
available for the task.”226
Similarly, the 2005 planning regulations do not impose any requirements that
LRMPs dictate population monitoring. The Forest Service explained that population data
are difficult to obtain and evaluate due to factors beyond the agency’s control that affect
populations.
The Department believes that it is best to focus the agency’s monitoring program
on habitat on NFS land where the agency can adjust management to meet the
needs of certain species. Desired conditions are often a focus of the monitoring
program. The agency will identify species-of-concern and species-of-interest. . . .
Where ecological conditions for these species are identified as desired conditions,
the habitat could be monitored to assist in avoiding future listing of these
species.227
The regulations do not prohibit population monitoring, and the agency may require it in
as-yet undefined “appropriate” circumstances.228 But Forest Service directives issued
after the 2005 planning regulations take the position that, “[f]or most species, the only
practicable quantitative evaluation is assessment of habitat conditions.”229
222

36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2000). See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
See 70 Fed. Reg. at 1029 (describing Option 1 of the proposed rule).
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
Id. In issuing the directives that elaborate on the 2005 planning regulations, the Forest Service
explained that, although “[t]he viability standard will no longer be used,” Forest Service directives will
continue to require that planners identify listed species, species-of-concern, and species-of-interest; collect
available data and information for those species, including population data; develop management direction
for the species; and assess the effects of management actions. 71 Fed. Reg. at 5138.
227
70 Fed. Reg. at 1029.
228
Id.
229
FSH 1909.12, § 43.26. See also Seidman & Burdin, supra note 139, at 43 (stating that, “[i]nstead of
wasting valuable agency resources on the impractical task of attempting to inventory all species or even
223
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More specifically, the 2005 regulations scrap both the MIS monitoring
requirements imposed by the 1982 regulations and eliminate the provisions of the 2000
regulations relating to focal species.230 In response to comments on the proposed rule
suggesting that the final rule impose survey and monitoring requirements for MIS or
focal species, the Forest Service explained that it chose not to require MIS monitoring
because “recent scientific evidence identified flaws in the MIS concept.”231 According to
the agency, that evidence refuted the notion that population trends for certain species
could serve as surrogates for other species.232
The Forest Service also rejected the concept of focal species initially proposed by
the Committee of Scientists and adopted in the 2000 planning regulations based on its
conclusion that that concept “is untested and it would not be prudent to potentially make
the same mistake with focal species as was made with MIS in the 1982 planning rule.”233
The agency conceded, however, that the premise that focal species can serve “as
indicators of the ecological conditions may have merit” and stated that Forest Service
directives might use focal species “as a tool to identify monitoring approaches to assess
progress towards achieving the desired condition articulated in a plan.”234
The Forest Service directives issued subsequent to the 2005 planning regulations
state that it is important to identify species listed under the ESA, species-of-concern, and
species-of-interest that are present in the plan area and gather existing information about
them. One directive provides:
representative indicator species, the Service has recognized that healthy and diverse ecosystems are the best
indicator of healthy wildlife populations”).
230
The regulations contain special provisions applicable to NFS units governed by plans developed under
the 1982 planning rules. Planning officials may meet MIS obligations by considering data and analysis
related to habitat, unless the plan specifically requires population monitoring or population surveys. 36
C.F.R. § 219.14(f) (2006); 70 Fed. Reg. at 1052. The Forest Service explained:
Providing explicitly for MIS monitoring flexibility will allow for monitoring of habitat conditions
as a surrogate for population trend data. It is appropriate for a range of methods to be available to
estimate, or approximate, population trends for MIS. The Responsible Official will determine
which monitoring method or combination of monitoring methods to use for a given MIS.
Id. Even when planning officials decide to conduct actual population monitoring for MIS, the preamble to
the 2005 regulations expresses a preference for using a sampling program instead of a total enumeration.
Id. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 881 (D. Ariz. 2006) (confirming that,
under § 219.14(f), the Forest Service has “the option to utilize habitat data as to any obligation regarding
MIS”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, and remanded, 479 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007).
231
70 Fed. Reg. at 1048. The Forest Service added:
Other tools can often be useful and more appropriate in predicting the effects of projects that
implement a land management plan (such as examining the effect of proposed activities on the
habitat of specific species); using information identified, obtained, or developed through a variety
of methods (such as assessments, analysis, and monitoring results); or using information obtained
from other sources (such as State fish and wildlife agencies and organizations like The Nature
Conservancy).
Id. at 1052.
232
Id. at 1048 (stating that through time, it “was found not to be the case” that “population trends for
certain species that were monitored could represent trends for other species”).
233
Id.
234
Id.
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However, in many cases it will be impractical to consider each species
individually in the planning process. Therefore, the Responsible Official may
identify a manageable subset of species on which to focus species conservation
measures and evaluation in the plan, plan amendment, or plan revision. For this
purpose, species groups and/or surrogate species may be used as an evaluation
and analysis tool to improve planning efficiency and for development of plan
components. When groups of species have been identified, one or more species
within each group may be selected to serve as surrogates for the ecological
condition for other species in the group, or surrogate species may be selected
based on other concepts such as umbrella species, keystone species, ecological
indicators, and so forth. If species groups and/or surrogate species are used,
clearly describe the process for identifying groups or surrogates including critical
assumptions and the uncertainty of conclusions. Explain why assumptions are
reasonable and why the degree of uncertainty is acceptable. Identification and use
of surrogate species is strictly an analysis and evaluation tool that may be used to
improve planning.235
Even when surrogates are used in the manner described in the directive, however,
“[t]here are no monitoring or inventory requirements for surrogate species.”236 Before it
issued the final directives that expand upon the 2005 planning regulations, the Forest
Service was urged by commenters to identify criteria for identifying surrogate species
and to describe how this tool will be used in the forest planning process. The Agency’s
response was simply that, “[a]s with any other approach used in NFMA planning, species
grouping and the selection of surrogates must take into account the best available science
and applicable portions of the Data Quality Act (44 U.S.C. 3516). An approach that does
not satisfy these criteria would not be used.”237
In short, the 2005 planning regulations as well as the directives subsequently
issued by the Forest Service neither “anticipate gathering population data for developing
a plan,” specify the types of data needed to implement LRMPs, nor prescribe any
requirements for monitoring of any resource. Instead, “[t]he types and amount of data
needed will be determined by [planning officials] taking into account best available
science.”238 In deciding what resources to monitor and in selecting the methods for doing
so, the agency has indicated that it intends to afford priority to circumstances that present
“a high degree of uncertainty associated with management assumptions.”239
(3)

Evaluation of the 2005 Planning Regulations

235

FSH 1909.12, § 43.24. The directive also explains that “one or more species within each macrohabitat
group may be selected as surrogates if they can be demonstrated to represent the ecological conditions for
all species in the group” and that “[i]f the needs of surrogate species are met, then most needs of other
species within the habitat group should also be met.” Id.
236
Id.
237
71 Fed. Reg. at 5141.
238
Id. at 5137 (emphasis added).
239
Id. (quoting FSH 1909.12, § 12.1).
U:\Word\articles\NFMA data gaps ssrn.doc
glicksman

Page 44

7/13/2007

To be published at 83 Indiana L.J., Issue # 2
The 2005 planning regulations depart from the rules that governed NFMA
planning from 1982 to 2000 and from the 2000 planning rules, had they ever gone into
effect, in several significant ways relevant to the implementation of the NFMA’s
diversity requirement. First, the regulations provide equal emphasis on the social,
economic, and ecological components of sustainability, whereas the 2000 regulations
clearly identified restoration and maintenance of ecological sustainability as the
preeminent goal of the NFMA planning process.
Second, they represent a marked shift from a mandate that planning officials
assess the consequences of management actions at both the ecosystem and species levels.
Although the 2005 regulations do not ignore species diversity, the default rule is that
protection of ecosystem diversity will serve as an adequate mechanism for protecting
species diversity as well. Planning officials must adopt mechanisms to provide specific
protection for species-of-concern or species-of-interest only if they conclude that
particular conditions in the planning area make it impossible for protection of ecosystem
diversity to also achieve the goal of species diversity.
Third, the 2005 regulations eliminate the viability requirement contained in the
1982 regulations. According to the Forest Service, the species viability requirement
diverted the agency’s attention away from the more important task of protecting diversity
at the ecosystem level. In addition, it was burdensome for planners to monitor the effect
of management actions on a large number of species, and the effort resulted in “mixed
success” at any rate. As two observers have indicated, the 2005 planning regulations
reflect the Forest Service’s attempt
to resolve the habitat-based versus population-based wildlife management
dilemma by abandoning the “species viability” approach and by selecting the goal
of maintaining or enhancing ecosystem diversity as “the primary means by which
a [forest] plan contributes to sustaining ecological systems” to provide for
diversity of plant and animal communities. The agency asserts that the more
effectively it maintains the ecosystem, the less it will need to analyze and plan at
the “species level of ecological organization.”240
It is not clear, however, whether the 2005 planning regulations install sufficient
monitoring or evaluation requirements to provide a meaningful check in the context of
particular decisions on the accuracy of the agency’s assumption that protection of
diversity at the ecosystem level will suffice to insure the protection of species-level
diversity as well.241

240

Seidman & Burdin, supra note 139, at 42.
See Jeffrey Rudd, The Forest Service’s Epistemic Judgments: Enhancing Transparency to Ensure
“New Knowledge” Informs Agency Decision-Making Processes, XXII TEMPLE ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 145,
198 (2004) (asserting that “[i]n the absence of an assessment of species diversity, the agency will be unable
to determine whether ecosystem level diversity provides the degree of species diversity protection
necessary to maintain a sustainable ecological system” and urging the Forest Service to “conduct species
level analysis in order to conclude that the ecosystem level plan complies with NFMA’s species diversity
requirements”).

241
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Fourth, consistent with the Forest Service’s focus on ecosystem as opposed to
species diversity, the 2005 regulations eliminate the requirement that planning officials
engage in population monitoring of any kind, although they permit such monitoring to be
conducted under individual plans. The regulations abandon the concept of MIS,
characterizing it as a “flawed” method for using limited information to predict the
consequences of management actions on the forest as a whole. The regulations also back
away from the designation of focal species, which were an important component of the
2000 regulations, because the Forest Service deems the concept to be untested and
imprudent.
The 2005 regulations, however, do not abandon the technique of using surrogate
components of the resources in the plan area to simulate the effect of management actions
on the broader ecosystem. On the one hand, the Forest Service justified throwing out the
use of MIS on the ground that recent scientific evidence refuted the premise that
population trends for individual species can serve as surrogates for the trends of other
species.242 On the other hand, because it is impractical to consider each species
individually in the planning process, the Forest Service directives permit planners to
identify a “manageable subset of species on which to focus conservation measures and
evaluation in the plan” and to use species groups or surrogate species as evaluative and
analytical tools.243 It is not clear why the Forest Service believes that such techniques
will provide useful information, even assuming that the agency provides forthright
descriptions of the uncertainties involved in the selection of the surrogates,244 if the
premise that tracking population trends for surrogate species can simulate trends for the
ecosystem in which they live has been found “not to be the case.”245
A particularly troublesome component of the new approach to reliance on
surrogates is the statement contained in Forest Service directives that, in selecting
surrogates, Forest Service personnel must take into account not only the best available
science, but also “applicable portions of the Data Quality Act” (also known as the
Information Quality Act (IQA). That statute requires that all federal agencies comply
with guidelines issued by the Office of Management and Budget to ensure and maximize
“the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical
information) disseminated by federal agencies.”246 The IQA has served as a tool by
which those opposed to the imposition of environmental protection measures have sought
to delay implementation of those measures and to censor information with which they
disagree or which they would rather not be disseminated because of its potential to put
their activities in a bad light. The IQA has become a basis for challenging agency efforts
to protect the public health and the environment by casting decisions made despite the

242

See 70 Fed. Reg. at 1048.
FSH 1909.12, § 43.24.
244
One observer, however, has expressed a fear that due to “[t]he inherent limitations in the process of
producing scientific knowledge[,] . . . Forest Service administrators will justify as “scientific” claims that
mask the level of uncertainty recognized by the broader scientific community.” Rudd, supra note 241, at
165.
245
70 Fed. Reg. at 1048.
246
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note).
243
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existence of scientific uncertainty as decisions based on “bad science.”247 Scientific
uncertainty is a pervasive attribute of environmental regulation, and its existence does not
necessarily reflect unsubstantiated decisions or decisions based on unsound science.248
The incorporation of IQA procedures into the NFMA process for protecting biodiversity
appears to be a prescription for imposing shackles on efforts by the Forest Service to use
the planning process to impose new constraints on resource extraction activities or other
uses with the potential to interfere with the restoration or protection of biodiversity.249
Moreover, the Forest Service has not abandoned the use of surrogates as
predictors of the effects of management actions on biodiversity. Rather, it has redefined
the surrogate. Instead of assessing the impact of management actions on individual or
focal species to determine whether the actions will frustrate the statutory requirements of
protecting plant and animal diversity, the Forest Service has chosen in most cases to
proceed on the basis of the assumption that assessing the impact of management actions
on species habitat, and taking measures to protect that habitat, will enable planners to
comply with the NFMA mandate that plant and animal diversity be protected through the
planning process. The Forest Service has thus resorted to the proxy-on-proxy approach it
began using under the 1982 regulations when it concluded that the monitoring of MIS
was too burdensome. The substitution of the proxy-on-proxy approach for the MIS-based
approach is problematic. Despite ongoing debate over how to define a species,250 it may
be even more difficult for scientists to agree on the definition of an ecosystem and on
how to measure its vitality.251 The more abstract the measurement chosen to represent
247

Sidney A. Shapiro et al., Ossifying Ossification: Why the Information Quality Act Should Not Provide
for Judicial Review, Center for Progressive Reform White Paper 601 (Feb. 2006), at 2-3, available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CPR_IQA_601.pdf.
248
Sidney A. Shapiro, The Data Quality Appropriations Ride: New Procedures and Information
Disclosure, Center for Progressive Reform Perspective (2005) (arguing that there is a “crucial distinction
between incomplete data and poor quality data”), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/perspectives/dataQuality.cfm.
249
Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB's Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)
10064 (2004) (arguing that the IQA creates a procedural apparatus that is likely to stifle the government’s
efforts to provide useful information to the public about their safety and health risks and about risks to the
environment). See generally Stephen M. Johnson, Junking the ‘Junk Science’ Law: Reforming the
Information Quality Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2006); Sidney A. Shapiro, The Information Quality Act
and Environmental Protection: The Perils of Reform by Appropriations Rider, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y REV. 339 (2004); Sidney A. Shapiro, The Case Against the IQA, 22 ENVTL. F. # 4 (July/August
2005), at 26; Michelle V. Lacko, Comment, The Data Quality Act: Prologue to A Farce or A Tragedy?, 53
EMORY L.J. 305 (2004).
250
J. B. Ruhl, The Battle Over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555, 576 n.57 (2004)
(“The scientific consensus on 'species' ... is that no complete consensus exists and that different definitions
suit different purposes.") (quoting Blake Hood, Transgenic Salmon and the Definition of "Species" Under
the Endangered Species Act, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75, 78 (2002)); Anna L. George & Richard L.
Mayden, Species Concepts and the Endangered Species Act: How A Valid Biological Definition of Species
Enhances the Legal Protection of Biodiversity, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 369, 369 (2005) (stating that “[t]here
is no single accepted definition of a ‘species’ in the natural sciences”).
251
Susan Harrison, Biodiversity and Wilderness: The Need for Systematic Protection of Biological
Diversity, 25 J. LAND, RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L. 53, 56 (2005) (“Academic ecology is full of unresolved
debates, however, over the degree to which communities or ecosystems are real entities with objectively
definable boundaries and in what ways their functional properties depend on their component species.”).
Cf. Kristin Carden, Bridging the Divide: The Role of Science in Species Conservation Law, 30 HARV.
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plant and animal diversity within a forest, the more likely it is that agencies can base
management decisions on undisclosed value judgments rather than falsifiable scientific
hypotheses. The status of the habitat of an MIS appears less concrete than a specification
of the rise or fall in MIS populations.
Fifth, the regulations introduce the concept of planning based upon a vague,
process-based “best available science” mandate. The regulations require that planners
identify scientific uncertainty and how it might affect planning decisions. Although the
2002 proposed regulations would have required planners to base their decisions on the
best available science, the final regulations only require than the agency “take into
account” the best available science, and the Forest Service has acknowledged that science
provides only one of many factors upon which it will make its planning decisions. There
is nothing inherently wrong with a process-based approach to the protection of
biodiversity. There is also merit, as discussed below,252 to the idea that the Forest Service
maintain flexibility in its efforts to protect biodiversity so that it can respond quickly and
effectively to changes in the state of scientific knowledge. Both the use of a procedurebased definition of diversity and the movement into agency directives of most of the
detailed prescriptions, substantive and procedural, for protecting biodiversity in the
NFMA planning process, are designed to achieve that freedom to respond to
circumstances as they develop.
The Forest Service Manual and the Forest Service Handbook are likely to be less
accessible than agency regulations, however, and some people interested in Forest
Service management may not even know about them.253 If the agency’s decisions are
being guided by standards and procedures shielded from public view, efforts to provide
meaningful input into Forest Service planning decisions may be frustrated.254 That result
seems contrary to the spirit if not the letter of what the statute demands of the agency. It
requires the Forest Service to “provide for public participation” in the development of
LRMPs255 and provides that, in exercising his or her authority under the NFMA, the
Secretary of Agriculture establish procedures to give the public adequate notice of and
opportunity to comment on the formulation of standards and criteria applicable to Forest
Service programs.256 It is hard enough for interested members of the public to provide
informed and useful input when the issues are as technical as they typically are in
determining the appropriate framework for approving management actions involving
forest lands and resources. It is harder still for such persons to play the role Congress
envisioned for them if the decisions are governed by criteria that are not readily available.

ENVTL. L. REV. 165, 216 (2006) (asserting that, “even given unlimited time, the complex, diverse, and
dynamic nature of ecosystems does not lend itself to our full understanding”).
252
See infra notes 281-7 and accompanying text.
253
The directives are accessible through the Forest Service’s official website, at
http://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives.
254
Cf. Rudd, supra note 241, at 164 (asserting that “the regulations shield from view the scientific process
of knowledge production and its relationship to the Service's responsibility to honor that process”).
255
16 U.S.C. § 1604(d).
256
16 U.S.C. § 1612(a).
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The barriers to informed participation in Forest Service planning efforts may even
reduce the utility of input from the scientific community outside the agency, particularly
in light of the possibility that the agency may not be receptive to interpretations of the
“available” science that conflict with their own.257 The Forest Service did not even
convene a Committee of Scientists before promulgating the 2005 regulations, in contrast
to the practices followed in the development of both the 1982 and 2000 planning
regulations,258 and in apparent violation of the NFMA’s requirement that the agency
convene and solicit input from a Committee as part of the process of implementing the
planning process.259
Far more worrisome than the accessibility of these directives, however, is their
legal status. Although the courts have reacted differently when asked to characterize the
status of Forest Service directives, some cases support the conclusion that the FSM and
the FSH lack the force and effect of law, are not binding upon the agency, and cannot be
enforced by private litigants in suits against the Forest Service. The Ninth Circuit, for
example, concluded that the FSM “does not rise to the status of a regulation” and
evidently need not be followed by the agency.260 The courts have reached similar results
in assessing the status of the FSH.261 If the Forest Service directives do not bind the
agency in its NFMA planning decisions, the 2005 regulations have moved in the direction
of vesting in the agency relatively unconstrained discretion in deciding how to implement
the NFMA’s diversity mandate, particularly given the vagueness and brevity (compared
to the 1982 and 2000 planning regulations) of the regulations themselves concerning
what the agency is required to do to restore and maintain plant and animal diversity. This

257

Rudd charges that
one of the fundamental problems with the Forest Service's reliance upon “science” to justify its
management decisions [is that the] present institutional relationship between the Forest Service
and the remainder of the scientific community fails to ensure “equality of intellectual authority
among qualified practitioners.” The Forest Service's choice of a “scientific” claim, theory, or
technique over a conflicting knowledge claim results from an epistemic judgment about the
relative values of the competing claims to address the problem at hand. The Service is not
required to support its judgment with direct appeal to the broader scientific community’s views
concerning the knowledge claims’ soundness.
Rudd, supra note 241, at 179.
258
See Flournoy et al., supra note 170, at 3, 4 (describing the input provided by the Committees convened
prior to issuance of the 1982 and 2000 regulations).
259
16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1) provides that, in carrying out the purposes of § 1604(g), which requires the
Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations governing the planning process, the Secretary “shall
appoint a committee of scientists who are not officers or employees of the Forest Service.”
260
Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 443 F.2d 452, 454-55 (9th Cir. 1971). See also Big Meadows
Grazing Ass’n v. United States, 344 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2003); Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
United States Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996); Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 585
(2002) (stating that agency manuals lack “the force of law”).
261
See, e.g., Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 148 F.3d 1231, 1243 n.11 (11th Cir. 1998). See also W.
Radio Serv. Co. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that neither the FSM nor the FSH has the
independent force and effect of law because they are not substantive in nature, are not promulgated in
accordance with the procedures specified in the Administrative Procedure Act, and are not issued pursuant
to an independent grant of congressional authority); City of Williams v. Dombeck, 151 F. Supp. 2d 9, 22
(D.D.C. 2001) (concluding that neither the FSM nor the FSH is mandatory because they were never
published in the Code of Federal Regulations).
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move toward decreased accountability is regrettable.262 Finally, the directives provide
little solace in that they state at one point that the agency’s assessment of ecosystem
diversity should “inform” planning decisions, rather than that the assessment will
determine, or even play a significant role in determining, the outcome of the planning
process.263
The degree to which the 2005 planning regulations conform to or deviate from the
NFMA’s dictate that LRMPs be developed in a manner that provides for the diversity of
plant and animal communities probably will be decided in the crucible of litigation. The
regulations did not settle the controversy over whether the statute mandates a speciesbased protection effort or allows the Forest Service to focus on habitat maintenance.
Likewise, the policy debate has not been stilled.264 Environmental groups have sued the
Forest Service, challenging the validity of the 2005 regulations on both substantive and
procedural grounds.265 In the first round of litigation, a federal district court in California
enjoined implementation of the 2005 regulations and remanded to the agency.266 The
court instructed the Forest Service to comply with notice and comment rulemaking
procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, the environmental assessment
requirements of NEPA, and the consultation requirements of the ESA, all of which the
agency contravened in issuing the regulations.267 The court did not address the
substantive validity of the regulations, including the provisions bearing on the Forest
Service’s responsibility under the NFMA to protect plant and animal diversity.
IV.

A GENERIC SET OF CRITERIA FOR MANAGING BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND
SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY THROUGH MODELING AND THE USE OF SURROGATES

The controversy over the Forest Service’s evolving approaches to fulfilling its
responsibility under the NFMA to protect biodiversity provides an opportunity to assess
what a regulatory program for making science-based decisions in the face of scientific
uncertainty should look like. This part of the article argues that such a regulatory
program should be realistic, collaborative, transparent, and flexible, and should install
mechanisms for insuring that the agency responsible for implementing the program may
be held accountable.
The necessity of making environmental and natural resource management policy
decisions despite the presence of considerable scientific uncertainty about the need for
and effects of such decisions will not disappear any time soon. As the stakes of waiting
262

See infra notes 298-303 for a discussion of the importance of agency accountability in the use of models
or other surrogate simulations.
263
FSH 1909.12, § 43.1.
264
See Seidman & Burdin, supra note 136, at 44 (asserting that the 2005 regulations “appear to have simply
fanned the flames of the controversy over forest wildlife management strategies”).
265
The claims raised by the plaintiffs include allegations that the Forest Service violated applicable notice
and comment rulemaking requirements, improperly failed to include adequate decisionmaking standards
regarding wildlife protection, failed to support its decision to “abandon” the species viability requirement,
and violated NEPA by refusing to prepare an environmental impact statement on the regulations. See id.
266
Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
267
Id. at 1110-01.
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until all of the “necessary” information is available get higher in resolving issues such as
how to combat global climate change, the need to make expeditious but informed
decisions before the decisionmaker has eliminated doubt only grows stronger.268
Agencies responsible for restraining the potentially harmful activities of industrial and
governmental polluters and for acting as stewards of publicly owned resources, and the
legislatures that delegate decisionmaking authority to such agencies, therefore must avoid
falling into the trap of believing that there is “an” optimal answer to a particular
environmental policy problem, and that if we wait long enough, science will provide us
with the information necessary to ascertain what that answer is and then allow us to put it
into effect. Uncertainty can easily be used, and unfortunately has been in many
environmental policy debates in the past, as “an excuse for inactivity, citing that ‘more
research is needed before a sound decision is made.’”269 Bounded rationality is here to
stay. The task at hand is not eliminating it, but reducing it to manageable proportions
through research and the use of simulation techniques, such as modeling, so that
reasonably informed judgments can be made about the relative merits of the competing
alternative policy choices.
Environmental agencies will continue to rely on models (like the dose-response
assessment models that permit extrapolation of animal test data on toxic chemicals down
to the levels of likely human exposure, or the identification of MIS or focal species to
serve as surrogates for the effect of the management alternatives being considered on the
larger ecosystem of which they are a part) to help them close the data gaps they face in
making policy judgments. In doing so, they should be careful not to cordon themselves
off from those who might provide useful input on the potential flaws in their modeling
exercises and on the availability of alternative means of managing bounded rationality.270
Agencies can isolate themselves either by making their decisions in secret, without
268

See Rose, supra note 1, at 294 (arguing that, “more than ever, policymakers cannot wait until scientific
evidence is conclusive; instead, they often have to make up their minds while the data is still tentative”).
269
Eric Wolanski et al., Mud, Marine Snow and Coral Reefs, 91 AMERICAN SCIENTIST 44 (Jan. 1, 2003),
2003 WLNR 13226176. The authors, who made this comment in discussing ecosystem models, assert that
“the major impediment at this point appears to be political will.” Id. Cf. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Evans, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1131-32 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (criticizing agency subject to mandate to make
decisions based on the “best available science” for characterizing new study as “junk science” as a pretext
for ignoring it), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oceana, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 457 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2006). Cf.
Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 484 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that agency’s finding that
yellowfin tuna fishery was not having an adverse impact on dolphin populations, which was supposed to be
based solely on the best available science under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and was couched in
those terms, was instead improperly influenced by international political concerns).
270
According to a critic of the 2005 planning regulations:
Although models may serve an important instrumental purpose, and “case studies may provide the
best approach to applied ecology,” both approaches are subject to the influence of bias and
assumption. Theoretical models’ assumptions risk the loss of specific knowledge about a
particular ecosystem or species in an attempt to demonstrate “exceptionless laws.” Case-studies’
background assumptions may sacrifice general knowledge transferable across study areas in favor
of detailed, local knowledge claims.
Rudd, supra note 241, at 207. See generally ORRIN H. PILKEY & LINDA PILKEY-JARVIS, USELESS
ARITHMETIC: WHY ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENTISTS CAN’T PREDICT THE FUTURE (2007) (contending that
mathematical models used to make scientific determinations yield results that depart from reality due to
factors such as erroneous assumptions and the reluctance to check predictions against natural outcomes).
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soliciting the views of knowledgable experts and lay persons, or by framing the debate in
terms that are so technical that the world of potentially useful contributors becomes
extremely small.
By combating this tendency and welcoming rather than dreading the possibility
that other experts have insights not yet developed by agency scientists, the agency
provides itself with an opportunity to reduce the level of uncertainty surrounding its
decision. Indeed, the “best available science” standard contained in the 2005 regulations
is fully consistent with the idea that agencies should reach out for expert advice if it is
interpreted as imposing on the agency an affirmative obligation to make reasonable
efforts (but not efforts so onerous as to cripple the agency’s ability to act within a
reasonable time frame) to supplement the existing knowledge base.271
There is some evidence that at least one court has begun to adopt a similar
approach in assessing the Forest Service’s compliance with the 2005 regulations. In an
NFMA-based challenge to the validity of a logging project governed by the “best
available science” mandate, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that the
Forest Service complied with the statute and regulations and remanded to the district
court with instructions to vacate the Forest Service’s approval of the project.272 The
Forest Service asserted that it followed the best available science, contending that it has
the discretion to decide what constitutes the best available science.273 The court rejected
that claim, however, concluding instead that the 2005 regulations “underscore that the
‘best available science’ is not just whatever the Forest Service finds on the shelf.”274 The
court was troubled by the Forest Service’s selective reliance on a 1992 Forest Service
report and in particular its contention that the court was obliged to deer to the agency’s
expertise whenever its conclusions differed from those in the report.275 The court
invalidated the logging project because, on the record before it, it was unable to
determine whether the Forest Service satisfied the best available science mandate. It
suggested that, on remand, the Forest Service look to the practice of agencies governed
by other statutes (including the ESA, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the MagnusonStevens Fishery and Conservation and Management Act) that require agencies to base
their decisions on the best available science. The court read the cases and regulations
interpreting those other statutes as clearly absolving the Forest Service of the need to
collect new data, but as requiring that it “seek out and collect all existing scientific
evidence relevant to the decision” and prohibiting it from ignoring existing data.276

271

See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that Congress imposes “best
available science” mandates as a means of requiring such affirmative, information-gathering efforts);
Doremus, Best Available Science Mandate, supra note 34, at 30-31 (urging both agencies and courts to
“return to the earlier interpretation that section 7 [of the ESA] imposes an obligation on the action agency
to provide any reasonably obtainable information”).
272
The Ecology Ctr. v. United States Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2006).
273
Id. at 1193.
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id. at 1194-95 n.4 (quoting Heartwood, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 380 F.3d 428, 436 (8th Cir.
2004)).
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Notably, it also established that “the best available politics does not equate to the best
available science.”277
The Tenth Circuit subsequently invalidated timber sales in two additional cases
based on the Forest Service’s noncompliance with the best available science mandate. In
one case, the court concluded that the agency provided no evidence that it used the best
available science in approving the project.278 In the other, the court found it “obvious”
that the agency did not satisfy its obligations to base approval of the logging project on
the best available scientific evidence and rejected the district court’s conclusion that the
error was harmless due to the agency’s reliance on other available data.279 The
administrative record contained no indication that the Forest Service ever considered its
best available science obligations before approving the timber sales.280 These precedents
may presage a refusal on the part of the courts to rubber-stamp the Forest Service’s
findings on whether individual projects were properly based on the best available science.
The fear that agency scientists will close themselves off from the potentially
conflicting views of experts on the outside is apparently a legitimate one in the context of
decisionmaking to preserve biodiversity. According to one account, “[o]ver the last 50
years, it appears that sections of the wildlife discipline have developed a certain
subculture that is not inclined to release strategic wildlife and habitat data on which
decisions are based.”281 The NFMA provides at last two concrete mechanisms for
combating any tendency of agency scientists to cut themselves off from potentially
dissenting views. First, as indicated above, the statute requires the Secretary of
Agriculture to convene and seek input from a Committee of Scientists when the Forest
Service embarks on the process of amending the planning regulations.282 Second, the
statute requires that, in providing for public participation in the planning for and
management of the national forests, the Secretary “shall establish and consult such
advisory boards as he deems necessary to secure full information and advice on the
execution of his responsibilities.”283 Those boards must reflect a cross-section of groups
interested in planning and management decisions governing the use and enjoyment of the
national forests.284 The Forest Service should scrupulously follow these solicitation
requirements, and other environmental and natural resource management agencies should
likewise create or take advantage of procedures that allow them to collaborate with
experts outside the agency before deciding how to narrow the relevant data gaps that
seem to pose obstacles to informed policy judgments. As one critic of the 2005 planning
regulations has argued:

277

Id. at 1194 n.4 (quoting Midwater Trawlers Co-Op. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 282 F.3d 710, 720 (9th Cir.
2002)).
278
Utah Envtl. Cong. V. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1135-37 (10th Cir. 2007).
279
Id. at 1287. Interestingly, the court noted that the Forest Service “relied solely on MIS-based analysis in
approving these three projects.” Id.
280
Id. at 1288.
281
Huetmann, supra note 65, at 470.
282
16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1).
283
16 U.S.C. § 1612(b).
284
Id.
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The objectivity of the science-based judgments required by the “best available
science” regulation will only be established through interactive discourse between
the agency and the broader scientific community; i.e., through the process of
“transformative criticism.” Scientific “consistency checks” will limit the
introduction of arbitrary or subjective preferences undermining the scientific
knowledge production process and its reasonable impact on Forest Service
planning decisions.285
He adds that “the influence of bias and authoritarian tendencies will only be prevented by
transparent and collaborative decision-making processes.”286
Agencies making science-based decisions in the face of bounded rationality must
reach out to more than just the scientific experts, however. Although scientific
information is no doubt essential to an agency’s ability to make resource allocation
decisions such as the ones at issue in the NFMA planning process, these decisions
“cannot be divorced from underlying value-based considerations, including related
political, economic, social, and aesthetic judgments,” especially when, as is often the
case, scientific debate precludes the technical experts from settling upon a single, right
answer.287 The solicitation of input from all interested members of the public, including
but not limited to those subject to environmental regulation and those seeking permission
to use public resources, is essential to the making of informed judgments on those extrascientific questions.
Unless the agency explains its options in terms accessible to non-experts, it
cannot hope to receive useful input on questions such as whether to monitor wildlife
habitat through the use of a model that extrapolates from the effects of a decision on a
single species to the effects of that decision on all species, or instead to focus on the
effects of the decision on the habitat of a species or group of species. Moreover, the
agency should make efforts to distinguish between the scientific and non-scientific
components of the relevant decision of whether and how to use a model or other
simulation technique.288 Part of the agency’s full disclosure efforts ought to involve
explaining the limits of the modeling approach being considered and describing the
assumptions built into the model, and the policy judgments upon which those
assumptions rest.289
285

Rudd, supra note 241, at 186. In particular, Rudd argues that the Forest Service must “(1) develop
standards for reviewing relevant claims produced by the broader scientific community, and (2) design
collaborative processes involving non-agency scientists to establish through transformative criticism the
credibility of the agency's science-based positions.” Id. at 186-87.
286
Id. at 187.
287
Keiter, supra note 111, at 324. See also Holly Doremus, Natural Resource Management in the Bush
Administration, 32 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 249, 299-303 (2005).
288
See, e.g., Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note 31, at 1130-31 (arguing that, “[i]nstead of remaining
hidden, the non-scientific elements of the listing decision should be consigned to a more openly political
process,” and that “[s]uch a process would permit the airing of all relevant viewpoints, provide a forum to
educate the public concerning the range of benefits provided by species, and ultimately provide a more
solid political foundation for conservation policy”).
289
Larson et al., supra, note 132, at 116, argue that “[t]he validity of habitat suitability models may be
questionable, and the direct effects of variation in habitat suitability on wildlife vital rates are often
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In addition to being realistic, collaborative, and transparent, any decisionmaking
process that relies on models or similar simulation techniques to mitigate the difficulty
that bounded rationality imposes on agency decisionmakers should be flexible. Because,
by definition, the situations in which models are used involve scientific uncertainty, the
existing body of relevant knowledge is likely to change over time. It makes no sense,
therefore, to create an approach to addressing bounded rationality that is set in concrete.
Rather, what is needed is a decisionmaking process that allows the agency to adjust its
approach to conform to new information.290
One means of providing such flexibility (although some have characterized it as a
“trendy” one) is adaptive management. 291 As Brad Karkkainen has explained:
The argument for adaptive management proceeds from the recognition that
conventional environmental regulation and natural resource management operate
piecemeal, attempting to fraction ecological complexes into smaller, putatively
manageable components, and parceling out management responsibilities among
mission specific agencies and programs.292

unknown. It is important, therefore, that model users evaluate these uncertainties and make them explicit,
so model results can be interpreted appropriately.” See also Fine & Owen, supra note 6, at 971
(contending that “[a] public participant cannot effectively scrutinize a model-based decision without having
some understanding of the uncertainties involved, and both modelers and planners therefore ought to be
explicit and comprehensive in their discussions of uncertainty”); Kann & Weyant, supra note 39, at 29
(urging modelers to lay out assumptions inherent in different models explicitly and be more explicit about
the level of confidence they have in model outputs). Fine and Owen add that “[a] modeling prediction
unqualified by disclosure of known, or knowable, sources of error is fundamentally deceptive. It conveys a
level of certainty that does not exist, hides real risks, and fails to explain key information that ought to be
factored into policy choices and decisions. Without such information, public debate may be pointless.” Id.
at 972.
290
See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 5, at 153 (urging the use of decisionmaking processes that “allow midcourse corrections”); Doremus, Constitutive Law, supra note 1, at 375-76 (supporting “sufficient flexibility
to permit [the agency] to respond to new information, changed conditions, and the progressively sharper
conflicts that will inevitably characterize environmental problems”). Jamison E. Colburn, The Indignity of
Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57 ALA. L. REV. 417, 498 (2005), argues that federal wildlife habitat laws
are not well suited in their current form to adapt to changing circumstances and to learning in light of
experience and that “[a] more reflexive and pragmatic model is needed if we are to preserve much of the
habitat our wildlife require.” For discussion of a variety of pragmatic approaches to environmental
regulation and natural resource management that respond to the need for agencies to make decisions despite
scientific uncertainty, see SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 21, at 147-77.
291
Bosselman, supra note 107, at 496-97. On adaptive management, see generally J.B. Ruhl, Regulation
by Adaptive Management — Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, Taking
Adaptive Management Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249
(2004); J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885 (2003); J.B. Ruhl,
Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by
Making A Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy
and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and Back Again, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 59 (2005).
292
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Towards A
Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 945-46 (2003).
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Conservation ecologists, among others, have supported the iterative approach reflected in
an adaptive management-based decisionmaking regime, based on the recognition that the
policy approaches developed to deal with questions such as how to protect plant and
wildlife diversity are “inescapably provisional and experimental, subject to subsequent
modification in response to new learning and changing conditions.”293 The idea is to use
feedback from experience with the approach initially selected to “pragmatically and
continuously adjust both ends and means in light of experience and learning.”294 The
need for flexibility is particularly acute in the context of land and resource planning,
which is designed to provide an ongoing framework for resource allocation decisions
given that the state of the resources being managed is continuously in flux.295
The NFMA envisions precisely this sort of flexible, iterative management
process. It requires that the Forest Service’s regulations for developing LRMPs “insure
research on and (based on continuous monitoring and assessment in the field) evaluation
of the effects of each management system to the end that it will not produce substantial
and permanent impairment of the productivity of the land.”296 The provisions of the
directives that implement the portions of the 2005 planning regulations which deal with
protection of biodiversity fare relatively well when judged under this criterion. The FSH,
for example, states that “[d]evelopment of plan components for ecosystem diversity and
species diversity may be an iterative process”297 (although it would have been better to
state that the process should or must be iterative). The FSH also provides that such an
iterative process “may suggest the need for refinement of a proposed plan . . . that would
then require additional analysis.”298
An agency’s use of modeling or simulation techniques to facilitate its ability to
make decisions in the face of scientific uncertainty must insure that the agency remains
accountable for its choices. Unless the agency is accountable for its decisions,
the normative suggestions for decisionmaking in the face of scientific uncertainty
discussed above will not amount to much. The substantive output of agency modeling
293

Id. at 943.
Id. See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907-08 (2002) [cited hereinafter as
Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA] (contending that a shift “in the focus of information production
from the uncertain and speculative realm of comprehensive ex ante prediction to the pragmatic empiricism
of observation, measurement, and verification” through the use of management tools such as those that
employ digital technologies “enable systematic error detection and correction, early identification of
unforeseen circumstances, and ongoing advances in our understanding of complex natural systems”; as a
result, decisionmaking can be situated “on a firmer pragmatic and empirically grounded footing, and
expand the decisionmaker's capacity to learn and to adjust decisions over time”).
295
Cf. Bosselman, supra note 107, at 496-97 (stating that “organizations learned from practical experience
that simple extrapolations of history and cadres of professional planners failed to lead to innovation,
adaptation to change, or even survival”); Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA, supra note 294, at 965
(arguing that “efforts at ecosystem management emphasize the need for experimentation and dynamic
adjustment in response to new learning”); Rudd, supra note 241, at 167 (contending that “[t]he varying
degrees of uncertainty characterizing the explanation and prediction of natural phenomena highlight the
importance of continually evaluating models and theories in light of new evidence”).
296
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(C).
297
FSH 1909.12, § 43.26.
298
Id.
294

U:\Word\articles\NFMA data gaps ssrn.doc
glicksman

Page 56

7/13/2007

To be published at 83 Indiana L.J., Issue # 2
efforts is not likely to improve, for example, if the agency engages in a collaborative and
transparent information-gathering and analytical process, only to blithely ignore the input
it has received by reaching a predetermined result. Accountability can take one of
several forms.299 Congress has mechanisms, such as legislative oversight hearings and
budgeting decisions, by which it can seek to avert or reverse agency decisions that
frustrate legislative intent. It is unlikely, however, that Forest Service decisions
concerning the formulation and application of models for assessing the impact of agencyapproved management actions on biodiversity will surface on the legislative radar screen.
Realistically, accountability for agency decisions involving modeling or related
simulation techniques to fill scientific data gaps probably depends on meaningful judicial
review. The courts have shown the inclination and the capacity, despite the technical
nature of the questions involved, to overturn decisions in which environmental agencies
applied a model that bore “no rational relationship to the reality it purport[ed] to
represent.”300 The courts traditionally adopted an extremely deferential posture to the
review of Forest Service decisions, however, particularly when the agency made the
challenged decisions under multiple use, sustained yield statutes such as the NFMA.301
In one case involving an attack on Forest Service planning decisions, for example, the
court required the plaintiffs to demonstrate that “there is virtually no evidence in the
record to support the agency’s methodology.”302
Reviewing courts have the capacity to play a more useful function in holding
agencies accountable for science-based decisions than that.303 At a minimum, the courts
must insist that agencies seeking to fill gaps in scientific knowledge through modelingtype exercises abide strictly by whatever procedural devices Congress has chosen to
impose upon them to facilitate transparent decisionmaking that is informed by input
received through a process that allowed meaningful public participation. Beyond that,
the courts must require that the agencies provide explanations for their decisions that
reveal the assumptions upon which their models proceeded, as well as descriptions of the
remaining scientific uncertainties and how they affected the agency’s choices. Finally,
the courts should vacate or remand agency decisions in which the agency’s explanation
fails to demonstrate that the model used is an appropriate one for dealing with the
particular data gaps the agency is trying to fill or that a relevant model has been

299

“Accountability can be roughly defined as the ability of one actor to demand an explanation or
justification of another actor for its actions and to reward or punish that second actor on the basis of its
performance or its explanation.” Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Democratic
Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005).
300
Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting American Iron &
Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). See also supra notes 85-91and accompanying
text.
301
See 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 96, at § 16:5 (stating that “administrative decisions authorized
under multiple use, sustained yield statutes are at present almost unreviewable, even for abuse of
discretion”).
302
Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732 (D. Or. 1993).
303
See Rudd, supra note 241, at 149 (arguing that “[t]raditional judicial deference to the Forest Service’s
decision-making processes on scientific issues is insufficient to ensure that scientific claims are fairly
evaluated”).
U:\Word\articles\NFMA data gaps ssrn.doc
glicksman

Page 57

7/13/2007

To be published at 83 Indiana L.J., Issue # 2
misapplied.304 There is some preliminary evidence in the early decisions reviewing the
Forest Service’s application of the 2005 planning regulations that the courts may be
willing to undertake each of those tasks.305
Finally, environmental and natural resource management agencies should take the
position that when scientific uncertainty hinders their ability to predict the nature of the
impact of their decisions on the public health or on the health of sustainable public
natural resources such as those found in the national forests, despite reliance on modeling
and evaluation of surrogate trends, the burden of justifying any activity that poses threats
to those resources should be allocated to those who support agency approval of those
activities.306 The potential for pollution or public natural resource development to
impose irreparable harm should not be ignored or minimized simply because the nature
of the effects of those activities is as of yet unascertainable. Requiring those supporting
agency actions with potentially damaging environmental effects to bear that burden is
consistent with the thrust of much of the federal environmental and natural resource
management legislation under which these decisions are made, which was adopted in
large part to control speculative risks to health and the environment.307

304

Rudd also suggests that courts supplement the administrative record by calling witnesses and impaneling
experts to evaluate agency science-based decisions. See id. at 149, 216-21.
305
See supra notes 272-80 and accompanying text.
306
See, e.g., A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A PROJECT OF
THE CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION 124 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Rena Steinzor eds., 2005)
(stating that “[w]here uncertainty exists, the proponent of the potentially degrading activity should bear the
burden of proving that the activity will not cause unacceptable adverse impacts”).
307
See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 750-51; Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1454 (9th
Cir. 1988) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-697(1978), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2576))
(stating that, to the extent there is any scientific uncertainty as to what constitutes the “best available
scientific information” for purposes of § 7(a)(2) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), Congress intended
that the FWS, in issuing biological opinions under the ESA, “give the benefit of the doubt to the species”).
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